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ABSTRACT 
Adjusting Payroll with Changes in Business Volumes: An Examination of Nevada 
Gaming Properties 
 
by 
Toni Ann Repetti 
Dr. Michael Dalbor, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 This dissertation analyzes expense preference behavior by managers of Nevada 
casinos.  Annual aggregate data is obtained from the Nevada Gaming Control Board from 
1990 to 2010.  Using ordinary least squares regression, three models are run to account 
for various payroll related expenses.  The dependent variable in the first model is number 
of employees.  The second model uses salaries and wages as the dependent variable and 
the third model uses total payroll.  All models include predictor variables of total revenue 
as an indication of size, a dummy variable for market concentration and a dummy 
variable for recessionary periods. 
 The finding show that larger casinos spend more in payroll related expenses.  Results 
indicate that for each 1% increase in revenue, number of employees increases 0.84%, 
salaries and wages increase 0.96% and total payroll increases 0.99%.  The significant 
positive relationship between revenue and payroll related expense may be an indication 
of expense preference behavior by managers since larger firms typically have more layers 
of management.  The additional layers also cause a separation between owners and 
managers and the more layers, the more separation.  The market share variable is 
nonsignificant in all three models.   
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The recession variable was significant and negative in all models.  During 
recessionary periods, Nevada casinos decrease number of employees 35.5%, salaries and 
wages 7.7% and total payroll 5.2%.   The negative significant relationship between the 
recession variable and payroll related expenses may also be an indication of expense 
preference behavior by Nevada casino managers during non-recessionary periods.  Since 
managers are able to decrease payroll related expense after controlling for the change in 
business volumes, they are most likely operating inefficiently during non-recessionary 
periods. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The main goal of many firm managers in the United States is to maximize the wealth 
of the shareholders.  Casino firms are no exception.  Some of the largest gaming 
companies in Nevada have company mission statements or goals in which shareholder 
wealth maximization is their main concern.  MGM Resorts International‟s (2011b) 
mission statement states “Our mission is to deliver our winning combination of quality 
entertainment, luxurious facilities and exceptional customer service to every corner of the 
world in order to enhance shareholder value and to sustain employee, customer and 
community relationships”.  Boyd Gaming‟s (2011) corporate mission states that “through 
teamwork, we strive to maximize shareholder value, to be among the leading companies 
in our industry and to provide opportunities for all while we support and enhance our 
communities”.  Both of these corporations list increasing shareholder value as the first 
goal.   
Most Nevada gaming companies do not have public mission statements, though they 
still note that shareholder wealth maximization is a goal of the firm.  Station Casinos, Inc. 
(2006) stated in their 2005 annual report that acquiring land and properties was one of 
their keys to driving shareholder value over the next decade (p. 52).  TPG Capital, one of 
the two private equity groups that owns Caesars Entertainment, formally Harrah‟s, states 
on their website, “Our goal is to help management teams build long-term value that 
benefits all stakeholders” (TPG Capital, n.d.).  American Casino & Entertainment 
Properties, LLC (2009) does not state that shareholder maximization is a specific goal, 
but they do state “management‟s focus on increasing operating cash flow”.  These five 
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companies alone account for 47 of the 256 casinos reported in the 2010 Nevada Gaming 
Abstract (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2010) and 47 of the 68 publicly owned 
casinos in this report.  This indicates the importance of shareholder wealth maximization 
to Nevada casino companies.   
Over the last five decades, some researchers have questioned whether managers are 
actually trying to increase the wealth of shareholders or if they are more concerned with 
increasing their own utility (Carter & Stover, 1991; Edwards, 1977; Gropper & Oswald, 
1996; Hannan, 1979; Hannan & Mavinga, 1980; Verbrugge & Goldstein, 1981; 
Verbrugge & Jahera, 1981; Williamson, 1963).  This concern led to the study of expense 
preference behavior by managers.  Expense preference behavior is when managers 
attempt to increase their own well being with additional pay or perquisites such as 
increased staff, luxurious offices, travel or entertainment (Williamson, 1963).  In addition 
to the empirical research on expense preference behavior there are many recent business 
examples of managers of publicly traded companies acting in ways to better themselves 
at the expense of the shareholders. 
In 1999, Enron‟s Board of Directors allowed Andrew Fastow, chief financial officer, 
to personally set up and run numerous partnerships which were involved in hedging 
transactions for Enron (Gray, Frieder, & Clark, 2005).  Enron executives also booked 
inflated and non-existent revenues amounting to $1.4 billion between 1997 and 2001.  
These revenues were really just bank loans (Mills, 2003).  By 2001, complaints were 
mounting that these false revenues and partnerships were doing nothing more than 
making Enron appear more attractive to investors and credit rating agencies and affording 
top executives more perks and benefits (Gray et al., 2005).  At the onset of these 
3 
 
complaints, the company stock price fell rapidly and market capitalization declined more 
than $60 billion.  While management profited, shareholders lost wealth due to the 
fraudulent revenue and loan transactions (Novack, 2003).  Upon further investigation it 
was determined that these transactions, which were described as Enron selling assets to 
itself, amounted to $35 million in management fees going to top executives with Fastow 
alone receiving $7 million (Gray et al., 2005).  Not only did shareholders lose value as 
the stock price dropped, there was also less cash available to them upon liquidation of the 
company since this cash was paid to top executives as management fees and bonuses. 
Around this same time, Tyco was also being investigated for accounting inaccuracies 
and excessive top executive perks.  Tyco executives were hiding company losses on 
mergers, one of which amounted to $379 million, and gave $170 million in interest free 
loans to each other with company funds.  Most of these loans were never repaid and 
instead were converted into unapproved bonuses.  Chief executive officer (CEO) Dennis 
Kozlowski was also found to be spending exorbitant amounts to fund his extravagant 
lifestyle (Gray et al., 2005).  Kozlowski spent $135 million for items such as antiques, 
art, decorating bills, a corporate apartment which only he lived in, and a $2.1 million 
birthday party for his wife.  Total losses were estimated at over $600 million (Kenny, 
2008).  Some doubt whether the accounting transactions were actually misrepresented 
(Mills, 2003), but there is no doubt that spending $600 million on personal expenses was 
not in the best interest of the shareholders. 
One of the largest corporate scandals involving moral hazard by top executives was 
that of Adelphia Communications, a US cable operator.  According to Assistant Attorney 
General Larry Thompson, due to faulty accounting, personal expenditures, and hundreds 
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of millions of dollars in theft, the company founders, the Rigas family, caused investors 
to lose over $60 billion (Gray et al., 2005).  Some of the personal activities included $252 
million in personal brokerage activities, $66 million in personal loans, $26 million in 
landscaping to preserve the view at the family home, $13 million for a golf course on the 
family‟s land, a $6,000 private jet expenditure to deliver a Christmas tree every year to 
the family, and 17 company cars (“Adelphia founder”, 2004; Gray et al., 2005).  The 
actions of the executives wiped out all the investor holdings and forced the company into 
bankruptcy (Mills, 2003).  During his testimony, assistant treasurer Michael Mulcahey 
stated that he understood that the company was owned by shareholders and that they were 
indirectly his boss (“Adelphia founder”, 2004).  Knowing this he ultimately still did what 
the Rigas family told him since he directly reported to them (“Adelphia founder”, 2004). 
During the 2007-2009 government bailout of banks and mortgage companies, CEOs 
were also acting in unscrupulous ways.  American International Group (AIG) received 
$85 billion in government bailout money which gave the US government an 80% stake in 
the company. Less than a week after receiving the bailout, top executives went on a 
week-long retreat spending over $440,000 on rooms, meals and spa treatments (Ross & 
Shine, 2008).  Moreover, the CEO received a bonus of $15 million which he claims was 
already substantially reduced due to poor performance (Ross & Shine, 2008).  AIG was 
not the only company under scrutiny.  Bank of America was also criticized for paying 
$15 billion for Merrill Lynch bonuses for 2008, a year in which the company had a fourth 
quarter loss of $21 billion and an annual loss of $11 billion (Blodget, 2009).  These 
bonuses were paid after Bank of America received $25 billion in government assistance 
in 2007 and $20 billion in cash and a $100 billion guarantee for loss of assets in January 
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2009 (Rucker & Stempel, 2009).  Bank of America paid back the $45 million in 
government assistance by the end of 2009 (Ellis, 2009). 
All the companies previously discussed were publicly traded companies with 
common stockholders.  The CEO and top executives are hired by the Board of Directors 
and form agency relationships.  When there is an agency relationship, there is the 
potential for agency problems since both the principal and the agent may have different 
goals.  The goal of the CEOs and other high level executives should have been to 
increase the wealth of the shareholders and not just themselves.  By behaving the way 
these managers did they were maximizing their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders.  The shareholders were losing value and wealth at the same time the 
executives were increasing their own wealth.  These recent business examples show that 
executives do not always maximize the value of the firm and instead maximize their own 
utility which supports expense preference behavior by managers.     
Research shows that managers who exhibit expense preference behavior most likely 
spend more in payroll related expenses (Arnould, 1985; Awh & Primeaux, 1985; Carter 
& Stover, 1991; Edwards, 1977; Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Hannan, 1979; Hannan & 
Mavinga, 1980; Lewin, Derzon, & Margulies, 1981; Verbrugge & Goldstein, 1981; 
Verbrugge & Jahera, 1981; Williamson, 1963).  This is a major concern for hospitality 
firms because payroll expenses are one of the top two expenses in hospitality firms, 
depending on the subsector.  In hotels, payroll is the largest expense (PKF Hospitality 
Research, 2005).  Payroll expense including all taxes and benefits in hospitality firms are 
approximately between 30% and 35% of revenues (PKF Hospitality Research, 2005; 
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Quek, 2000).  These same payroll expenses are between 40% and 50% of total expenses 
(PKF Hospitality Research, 2005; Quek, 2000).   
This is also true for casinos.  In Nevada casinos, payroll and benefits are the largest 
expenses where they average 29.5% of gross revenue (Nevada State Gaming Control 
Board, 2010).  This average is for all 256 casinos with over $1 million in gross revenue 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010.  In casino jurisdictions outside of Nevada, 
payroll expenses are the first or second largest operating expense only behind gaming 
taxes (American Gaming Association, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).   
Payroll expenses are also a very controllable expense in the hospitality industry.  
They are typically adjusted with changes in business volumes.  From 1980 to 1998, the 
correlation coefficient between revenue and labor costs per available room for hotels was 
0.9924 (Quek, 2000).  Hospitality firms have two options when adjusting payroll with 
business volumes.  Companies can decrease wages or decrease the number of employees. 
Surveys by Towers Perrin, Watson Wyatt and Hewitt Associates in 2009 find that in 
the current recession firms across industries are using layoffs rather than wage reductions 
to adjust payroll expenses (Giancola, 2009).  The ratios range from 3.4:1 to 6.4:1 in favor 
of layoffs over pay cuts.  This means that between 34% and 64% of all firms surveyed are 
laying employees off during the recession, while only 10% are cutting wages.  Campbell 
and Kamlani‟s (1997) survey concerning why wages stayed the same in 34 different 
industries during the recession in 1990-1991 finds that the strongest reason is that cutting 
wages would cause the most productive employees to leave.  They find that if firms lay 
employees off instead of cutting wages to save expenses, they may be able to terminate 
the least productive employees.   
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Nevada gaming companies are also faced with the decision of laying off employees 
or cutting wages when business volumes decrease.  When business volumes decreased 
immediately after September 11, 2001, casinos laid off more than 10,000 employees in 
response to the lower amount of visitors (Benston, 2008b).  During the 2007-2009 
recession, management also laid off workers, but at a slower pace than in 2001 when they 
immediately terminated employees.  During 2007, MGM Resorts International laid off 
1,000 employees and Caesars Entertainment laid off 2,000 employees (Benston, 2008b).  
MGM Resorts International also cut an additional 400 management jobs in early 2008.  
The company stated that these layoffs were not due to the recession but rather efficiencies 
from mergers that occurred 3-8 years earlier (Benston, 2008a).   
Wynn Resorts took a different approach at the onset of the 2007-2009 recession.  
They did not have any layoffs in 2007.  Instead the company was able to decrease 300 
jobs through attrition as employees left and the company did not refill their positions 
(Benston, 2008a).  In 2009, Wynn Resorts also cut salaries for all manager by 10-15%, 
reduced all full-time employees from 40 hours per week to 32 hours per week and 
suspended bonuses and 401K company matching funds (Spillman, 2009).  Similar to 
Wynn Resorts cutting hours, many other companies cut hours in addition to layoffs 
(Knightly, 2008).  Nevada gaming companies were trying to save expenses with the 
layoffs, reduced hours, and benefit decreases.    
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate Nevada casino managers and to assess 
if they may be maximizing their own utility or if their goal is wealth maximization for the 
shareholders.  Specifically this study evaluates management‟s behavior in regards to 
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payroll related expenses.  For the purpose of this dissertation, payroll related expenses 
will include number of employees in addition to wages and benefits.  The specific 
research questions are as follows: 
1. Are managers of Nevada gaming companies utility maximizers or shareholder 
wealth maximizers when it comes to payroll related expenses? 
2. Do payroll related expenses in Nevada gaming companies vary with the size of 
the company? 
3. Does level of competition affect the number of employees and the amount of 
payroll related expenses in Nevada gaming companies? 
4. Did the recession affect payroll related expenses and number of employees in 
Nevada casinos? 
Significance of Study 
Shareholder wealth maximization is not always the goal of managers in many 
industries and casinos are no different.  It is essential for casino owners to know if their 
managers are striving to achieve wealth maximization for the owners or for their own 
utility.  Every dollar that managers spend to maximize their own utility is one dollar less 
that the owners receive.  While this is important when firms are making money, it is even 
more important when the firm has declining revenues and profit margins.     
The most commonly used indicators for profit in casinos are EBITDA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and EBITDA margin (EBITDA 
divided by net revenue).  Net revenues are used in casinos to adjust for the 
complimentaries given to players.  During the largest gross revenue period for Nevada 
casinos, fiscal year ended June 30, 2007, Nevada casinos averaged an EBITDA margin of 
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25.4% (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2007).  This margin dropped to -8.8% for 
fiscal year ended June 30, 2009 (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2009).  In 
addition, the net income before taxes margin (net income before income taxes divided by 
net revenue) decreased from 10.1% to -34.8% during this same time period.  Casinos 
have seen these numbers increase in 2010 with an EBITDA margin of 9.5% and a net 
income before taxes margin of -18.7% (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2010).  The 
number of casino firms in Nevada also decreased between 2007 and 2009 by almost 4% 
and 2010 saw another decrease of almost 2% from 2009.  This decrease is still 
continuing, including the recent announcement of the closure of the almost 60 year old 
Sahara in Las Vegas (Stutz, 2011).  Firms are unable to operate successfully with these 
low margins.  
Casino shareholders need to be aware if management is spending more than needed to 
increase their utilization because it affects the profitability of the casino.  With decreasing 
margins and the increasing number of firms exiting the market due to financial 
performance, shareholders need managers whose goal is maximizing shareholder‟s 
wealth.  During times when casinos are running negative EBITDA margins, if the 
management team was maximizing shareholder wealth during the profitable times, the 
owners may have a better chance at making it through the down times. 
The gaming industry in Nevada is a good industry in which to test expense preference 
behavior by managers.  Williamson (1963) found that industries with high barriers to 
entry are more likely to have managers that exhibit expense preference behavior.  The 
gaming industry in Nevada has very high barriers to entry due to the regulatory 
environment and high fixed asset costs at start up even though almost anyone is able to 
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apply for a gaming license and operate a casino if approved.  The average gross fixed 
asset costs for a Nevada casino are approximately $234 million, while the largest casinos 
on the Las Vegas Strip have average fixed assets of almost $1.8 billion (Nevada State 
Gaming Control Board, 2010).  The regulatory environment in Nevada is one that is 
highly regulated and previous research indicates that high levels of regulation may lead to 
expense preference behavior by managers (Gropper & Hudson, 2003; Gropper & 
Oswald, 1996; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1999).   
Separation of ownership is another factor that is an indicator in previous expense 
preference behavior research and findings show that a greater separation of ownership 
leads to greater expense preference behavior by managers (Arnould, 1985; Hannan & 
Mavinga, 1980; Kim, Dalbor, & Feinstein, 2007; Verbrugge & Goldstein, 1981).  These 
previous studies differ in how they measure separation of ownership.  Different measures 
include the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the Board of Directors, whether 
the firm is owner or manager controlled, percentage of the firm that the primary owner 
owns and whether the firm is a stock or mutual organization.   
While individual casino information is not available, in fiscal year 2010, 76.2% of 
gross gaming revenue in Nevada was produced by 68 publicly owned casinos (Nevada 
State Gaming Control Board, 2010).  Being publicly owned, these casinos have a high 
separation of ownership.  Wynn Resorts Limited is an example of the separation of 
ownership that occurs in Nevada publicly owned casinos.  Steve Wynn, CEO, only owns 
8% of outstanding shares (Wynn Resorts Ltd., 2011).  In addition the two largest 
shareholders, who own 20% and 15% each, are institutional investors and there are 452 
large block owners (Wynn Resorts Ltd., 2011).   MGM Resorts International, which 
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owns 12 of the publicly owned casinos in Nevada, has no employee who holds over 1% 
of outstanding shares (MGM Resorts International, 2011a). The largest shareholder, 
Tracinda Corporations, is an institutional investor and owns 27% of outstanding shares 
(MGM Resorts International, 2011a).  Table 1 is a list of the publicly owned casinos that 
are included in the aggregate data analyzed in this dissertation. 
 
Table 1 
Publicly Owned Casinos in Nevada for 2010  
Corporation Casino 
American Casino & Entertainment LLC Aquarius Casino Resort 
Arizona Charlie‟s Boulder 
Arizona Charlie‟s Decatur 
Stratosphere Tower, Hotel & Casino 
 
Ameristar Casinos, Inc. Cactus Petes Hotel Casino/Horseshu Hotel and 
Casino 
 
Archon Corporation Pioneer Hotel and Gambling Hall 
 
Boyd Gaming Corporation California Hotel and Casino 
Fremont Hotel and Casino 
Gold Coast Hotel and Casino 
Main Street Station Hotel, Casino and Brewery 
Orleans Hotel and Casino 
Sam‟s Town Hotel and Gambling Hall 
Suncoast Hotel and Casino 
 
Colony Resorts LVH Acquisitions, LLC Las Vegas Hilton 
 
Hard Rock Hotel Holdings, LLC Hard Rock Hotel & Casino 
 
Harrah‟s Entertainment, Inc. Bally‟s Las Vegas 
Bill‟s Gamblin‟ Hall & Saloon 
Caesars Palace 
Flamingo Las Vegas/O‟Sheas 
Harrah‟s Casino Hotel Las Vegas 
Harrah‟s Casino Hotel Laughlin 
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Corporation Casino 
Harrah‟s Casino Hotel Reno 
Harrah‟s Resort Hotel/Casino and Harrah‟s 
Casino Hotel Lake Tahoe 
Imperial Palace Hotel & Casino 
Paris Las Vegas 
Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino 
Rio Suite Hotel & Casino 
 
Herbst Gaming, Inc. Buffalo Bill‟s Resort & Casino 
Primm Valley Resort & Casino 
Sands Regency 
Terrible‟s Hotel and Casino 
Terrible‟s Rail City Casino 
Whiskey Pete‟s Hotel & Casino 
 
Jacobs Entertainment, Inc. Gold Dust West 
 
Landry‟s Restaurants, Inc. Golden Nugget 
Golden Nugget Laughlin Hotel & Casino 
 
Las Vegas Sands Corp. Venetian Casino Resort/Palazzo Resort Hotel 
Casino 
 
MGM Resorts International Aria Resort & Casino 
Bellagio 
Circus Circus Hotel & Casino 
Circus Circus Hotel/Casino – Reno 
Excalibur Hotel and Casino 
Gold Strike Hotel and Gambling Hall 
Luxor Hotel and Casino 
Mandalay Bay Resort & Casino 
Mirage 
Monte Carlo Resort & Casino 
New York - New York Hotel & Casino 
Silver Legacy Resort Casino 
 
Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc. Atlantis Casino Resort 
 
Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. Boomtown Reno 
 
Riviera Holdings Corporation Riviera Hotel & Casino 
 
Station Casinos, Inc. Aliante Station Casino + Hotel 
Boulder Station Hotel & Casino 
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Corporation Casino 
Fiesta Casino Hotel 
Fiesta Henderson Casino Hotel 
Green Valley Ranch Station Casino 
Palace Station Hotel & Casino 
Palms Casino Resorts 
Red Rock Casino Resort Spa 
Santa Fe Station Hotel & Casino 
Sunset Station Hotel & Casino 
Texas Station Gambling Hall & Hotel 
 
Tropicana Entertainment, Inc. Montbleu 
River Palms Resort Casino 
Tropicana Express Hotel & Casino 
 
Wynn Resorts, Limited Wynn Las Vegas/Encore 
Source: Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2010 
 
This dissertation will also add to the current research on expense preference behavior.  
In particular, it will increase the amount of research on expense preference behavior by 
managers in hospitality organizations.  This will be the third known study on expense 
preference behavior in hospitality and the only one concerned with casino firms.  In 
addition this will be the only known expense preference study that will evaluate 
management‟s reaction to recessionary periods in regards to payroll related expenses.  
This study will also provide a quantitative analysis of how Nevada casino managers 
adjust payroll related expenses under varying organizational and economic differences.   
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters.  The first chapter includes an 
introduction, a description of the problem statement and research questions, and the 
significance of this dissertation.  Chapter 2 provides the review of the related literature.  
In Chapter 3, the research methods and design are presented and include the proposed 
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statistical analysis technique, conceptual models, and hypotheses.  The results of the 
hypothesis testing and answers to the research questions are presented in Chapter 4.  The 
final chapter includes a discussion of results, implications, limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviews the theory and literature pertinent to expense preference behavior 
by managers.  The first two sections will discuss shareholder wealth maximization and 
agency problems which can often be attributed to managers not maximizing 
shareholder‟s wealth.  The third and fourth sections will discuss expense preference 
theory, a conflicting theory to shareholder wealth maximization.       
Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
There are four main types of business organizations: sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, limited liability companies and corporations.  Within each of these types, 
there is a wide variety of ways in which to structure a particular firm.  For example, there 
can be anywhere from one owner to thousands, the firm can be public or private, and the 
firm can be owner managed, use a management company, or have an internal 
management team.  Regardless of a firm‟s structure, shareholders exist.  Shareholders can 
include the owners in sole proprietorships and partnerships or stockholders, all of whom 
have the potential to profit if the firm does well, but they also carry the risk of loss if the 
firm does poorly. 
Graham, Smart, and Megginson (2010) explain what shareholders expect in return for 
this risk.  Shareholders are only paid after all other stakeholders, such as customers, 
employees, creditors, and suppliers are paid.  The shareholders hold a residual claim 
which means they take the last place in line and assume a risk and with that risk they 
expect maximum return.   
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The financial goal of the firm is shareholder wealth maximization.  The managers of a 
firm, regardless of personal ownership stake, should do what is within their control to 
maximize wealth for the shareholders.  This wealth can come in the form of profit 
distributions, dividends, or an increase in stock price.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
discuss this theory of the firm by explaining the behavior of managers in differing 
contexts.  When a firm is wholly owned and managed by one manager, the manager will 
make decisions to maximize his wealth.  Manager wealth may come in the form of salary 
or non-pecuniary items such as offices, staff, or donations to charity.  The owner/manager 
can exchange the profit the firm would make and have distributed to themselves for their 
increased salary or non-pecuniary items and be in the same wealth position.  As the 
owner/manager sells off a portion of the firm, the new owners are only willing to pay a 
price lower than what the old owner wants because they are aware that they will need to 
incur monitoring costs to make sure the manager still runs the firm with the goal of 
maximizing the wealth of all the new owners.  The larger portion of the firm that is sold, 
the higher the monitoring costs and the lower the price the new owners are willing to pay.  
In all cases the manager is maximizing shareholders‟ wealth, whether they are 
maximizing it for themselves or the monitoring is causing them to act this way. 
Fatemi, Ang, and Chua (1983) want to further validate what Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) believe.  They study manager goals in large management controlled firms.  By 
looking only at firms that had management control which was separate from the owners, 
they are able to evaluate if managers are most likely to behavior in non-wealth 
maximizing goals which conflicts with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.  The 
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authors find that shareholder wealth maximization was the dominant goal of 
management.     
Shareholder wealth maximization by managers is also the main goal that is taught in 
finance classes, in and outside of hospitality.  Santos, Vega, and Barkoulas (2007) study 
fourteen of the most frequently used corporate finance textbooks and find that all of them 
state that the goal of U.S. firms is unconstrained shareholder wealth maximization.  In 
hospitality finance textbooks this is also stated as the goal of financial managers 
(Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005, p.7).  
Firms can be set up in a variety of ways, but no matter what the organizational 
structure there are shareholders.  Since shareholders have a residual claim on a firm, they 
require a maximum return for their risk (Graham et al., 2010).  The goal of managers 
should be to maximize shareholders wealth to compensate for this risk.  This is 
consistently described as the main financial goal of managers in both empirical research 
and in textbooks (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005; Fatemi et al., 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Santos et al., 2007).  Shareholder wealth maximization is not only theory as 
described above, but the true goal of many organizations in the gaming industry.  This 
goal is stated in many of the gaming companies‟ mission statements as discussed in the 
introduction (Boyd Gaming, 2011; MGM Resorts International, 2011b; Station Casinos 
Inc., 2006; TPG Capital, n.d.). 
Agency Problems 
While, sole proprietorships are the most common type of business organization, 
corporations are the preferred structure for large firms due to the limited liability of the 
owners (Brooks, 2010; Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005).  With sole proprietorships, the owner 
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is typically the manager but is not required to be.  On the other hand, a corporation may 
have a separation between owners and managers with the Board of Directors.  When an 
owner hires a manager or management team to work for them they are establishing an 
agency relationship (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005).  In an agency relationship the manager 
(agent) is hired to act on behalf of the owner (principal) and do what is in the best interest 
of the owner by maximizing shareholder wealth (Brooks, 2010; Titman, Keown, & 
Martin, 2011).  With any agency relationship, there can be potential problems because 
there are conflicting interests between the owners and managers or various other 
stakeholders.  Conflicts may arise because managers want to maximize their utility with 
increased pay and benefits, but these increased costs can come at the expense of the 
owners (Brooks, 2010).   
Potential agency problems include information asymmetry, adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Baye, 2010).  Information asymmetry occurs when one party has more 
information than another and can occur not only between owners and managers, but also 
between firms and customers and even between some employees and other employees 
(Baye).  Adverse selection is a form of information asymmetry in which an individual 
tries to conceal information from others.  Moral hazard is an action that one party takes 
and hides from the other (Baye).  Moral hazard on the part of managers within a casino is 
the concern of this dissertation. 
Holmstrom (1982) states that moral hazard occurs when an agent‟s actions cannot be 
readily observed by the principal.  The most common types of moral hazard are shirking 
and excessive consumption of perquisites (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005).  Chatfield and 
Dalbor define shirking as employees doing as little work as necessary without affecting 
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their pay.  This can occur at any level in the organization, including a CEO taking extra 
time off when paid a fixed salary or line employees taking extra breaks or doing their job 
at a slower pace than they are capable (Chatfield & Dalbor).  Excessive consumption of 
perquisites (“perks”) occurs when managers give themselves perks or other financial 
benefits to increase their value (Chatfield & Dalbor).  These additional perks may include 
fancy offices, corporate jets, corporate apartments or vacation homes, and company 
donations to charities of their choosing (Chatfield & Dalbor).   
Shankman (1999) states that since the goals of the agent and principal can be in 
conflict it may be difficult and expensive to control these problems.  The main reason is 
that both parties have different attitudes toward risk and all else being equal they will 
have different courses of action because of this varying risk.  One example of the varying 
amount of rick each party is willing to take is discussed by Jensen (1986).  Jensen finds 
that managers have an incentive to grow the firm because growth equates to more 
resources under the manager‟s control.  This growth may not be in the best interest of the 
owners if the net present value of the project is negative or the rate of return is below that 
which the owner requires (Jensen).  The manager may still grow the company because 
they will have more control and their risk does not change since the owner takes all the 
risk (Jensen).   
Even though it may be difficult or expensive, agency problems can be controlled with 
well written and enforced contracts and monitoring.  Establishing good contracts and 
monitoring managers incurs additional costs which are called agency costs.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) state that agency costs are the sum of the principal‟s monitoring costs, 
bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss of the owner.  The authors define 
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residual loss as the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the 
principal due to the divergence by the agent, which equates to the costs of the manager‟s 
moral hazard (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
There are numerous reasons for firms to increase agency costs to protect the wealth of 
their owners.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe that the magnitude of the agency costs 
depends on three factors: the taste of the manager, the ease in which the manager can 
make their own decisions, and the monitoring costs incurred to evaluate the manager.  
The more extravagant the taste of the manager, the higher the agency costs to control and 
monitor.  In addition, the more leeway a manager has in decision making, the higher the 
agency costs.  Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) find that agency costs will increase with an 
outside manager and these costs are inversely related to the managers‟ ownership share in 
the firm meaning that as the manager owns less of the company, agency costs will 
increase.  Agency costs will also increase as the number of non-manager shareholders 
increase, but will decrease with external monitoring from banks (Ang et al., 2000).  
The size of the firm is also a factor in regard to agency costs.  Berle and Means 
(1932) note that as companies increase their number of shareholders, no one shareholder 
holds enough shares to want to incur the monitoring costs and that management is 
released from the requirement of serving the goal of the shareholders.  This belief has 
been greatly debated and Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that larger organizations incur 
more agency costs even though monitoring is more difficult.    
While the goal of a firm‟s managers should be to increase the value of the firm for all 
shareholders, this may not always be achieved.  Managers and owners each have different 
interests and these interests typically involve maximizing their own wealth and not the 
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wealth of the other party.  When this conflict happens, agency problems arise.  These 
agency problems though can be monitored and controlled with effective contracts and 
monitoring, but at an increased cost.  Agency costs generally increase as a company gets 
larger and there is more separation between the owners and managers.  Minimizing 
agency problems and agency costs can effectively lead managers to maximize the value 
of the firm for the owners. 
Expense Preference Theory 
The agency problem of moral hazard can occur in many ways.  One way is by 
expense presence behavior by managers.  Expense preference behavior occurs when 
managers do not maximize the value of the firm but instead maximize their own personal 
utility (Williamson, 1963).   
Williamson is known for his seminal work on expense preference theory.  This 
involves management‟s potential desire for increased staff, expenditures for perquisites, 
and discretionary funds to the detriment of shareholders.  Since there are no limits on 
how a manager spends their pay they typically prefer an increased salary over other 
expenses, but there are advantages to managers increasing perquisites rather than taking a 
larger salary.  One advantage is that there are no personal income taxes on the perquisites 
like there are on pay.  Also, perquisites are typically less visible to other employees and 
board members as compared to salary.  Williamson notes the existence of discretionary 
spending by managers, but he also notes the existence of satisfactory profits.  Managers 
still need to meet an acceptable level of profit to get satisfaction from their work.  Also, 
increased discretionary profits, which are profits above the required minimum profits, 
may allow more spending on other perquisites managers want. 
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Williamson uses least squares regression to analyze various industries and the 
relationship between executive compensation and multiple independent variables that he 
believes are indicators of expense preference behavior by managers.  General and 
administrative expenses are expected to increase as a sign of expense preference 
behavior.  The variable for market concentration is used as an indicator for competition 
with a higher market concentration equating to less competition. A large market 
concentration increases the opportunities for management discretion.  Barriers to entry 
are represented by a dummy variable with a value of “0” for low barriers to entry and a 
value of “1” for high barriers to entry.  Williamson believes that a high barrier to entry 
will increase expense preference behavior by managers.  The final variable considered is 
the composition of the board of directors.  An increase in the amount of management 
representation on the board may lead to an increase in management‟s discretionary 
spending.   
For three different time periods (1953, 1957, and 1961), general and administrative 
expenses and market concentration are significant and positively related to executive 
compensation.  The barrier to entry variable is significant and positively related to 
executive compensation in two of the three years.  Of the eight significant coefficients, 
six are significant at the .001 level and two are significant at the .025 level which shows 
the high significance of these variables.  The composition of the board is significant in 
only one of the three years and the significance was only at the .10 level. 
Williamson follows the quantitative research with field study observations and finds a 
number of key reactions by managers in response to adversity.  At one firm in particular, 
following a sharp decrease in profits, management reacted by reducing company-wide 
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salaried employment 32%, corporate employment 41%, research and development staff 
68%, and public relations staff 88%.  These reductions were in number of employees and 
not in salaries.  These changes all incurred with production remaining the same.  Return 
on investment, which had fallen following the decrease in profits, doubled after these 
adjustments.  When profits are high, expenses may not be monitored closely.  However, 
as profits drop drastically, expenses also drop and undergo extensive scrutiny.  These are 
signs that managers may have been maximizing their utility instead of the value of the 
firm when profits were higher and may be an indication of expense preference behavior. 
Rees (1974) supports Williamson‟s (1963) findings and explains multiple ways in 
which managers of a firm can depart from shareholder wealth maximizing behavior.  
Two of these cases violate cost minimization and one of them, while minimizing costs, 
does not maximize profits.  The two cases that violate cost minimization are the “pure 
staff surplus model” and the “excess staff intensity model”.  The “pure staff surplus 
model” can occur when managers of a firm increase staff with no increase in output or 
when output decreases but staff remains the same.  The “excess staff-intensity model” is 
when there is a higher ratio of staff to output than what is required.  The case in which 
profits are not maximized is the “staff constrained model” which states that the only way 
a firm can increase staff is by increasing output.   
Numerous studies have been done to build on Williamson (1963) and Rees‟ (1974) 
findings.  While there has been mixed results, the majority support the notion of expense 
preference behavior by managers.  The following section is a brief description and 
summary of the studies that support or reject expense preference behavior by managers.   
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Expense Preference in Banking 
A large number of studies, particularly earlier ones, were conducted in the financial 
services industry using banking and savings and loan companies.  Edwards (1977) 
attempts to show that in highly regulated industries such as banks, expense preference 
behavior is more predominate than shareholder wealth maximizing behavior.  Edwards 
analyzes the relationship between a bank‟s labor costs and monopoly power in 44 
metropolitan areas for 1962, 1964, and 1966.  Using aggregate data from each market, 
regression analysis is conducted for eight models.  Four of them include number of 
employees as the dependent variable and four include total salary and wage expense as 
the dependent variable.  Under all models, monopolistic banks have a larger employee 
staff and higher labor expenses than competitive banks.  The analysis also shows that 
management favors more staff over higher salaries in monopolistic markets.  Edwards‟ 
findings show that banks in monopolistic markets have lower profits even with higher 
interest rates due to expense preference behavior by managers.  As competition increases 
so does profitability in those same banks because managers reduce costs to respond to the 
pressure of increased competition. 
Hannan (1979) follows Edwards‟ (1977) study by analyzing bank specific data and 
not aggregate data.  This study evaluates 367 banks from 49 different markets in 
Pennsylvania during 1970 and uses models similar to Edwards.  Hannan finds that banks 
that have a three-firm market concentration over 63% tend to exhibit expense preference 
behavior.  This study also finds that managers hire more staff rather than paying higher 
salaries.  Using aggregate and firm specific data, Edwards (1977) and Hannan (1979) 
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both find that bank managers in monopolistic markets exhibit expense preference 
behavior over shareholder wealth maximizing behavior. 
These previous studies concerning competition and expense preference behavior by 
firm managers have mainly concentrated on excess staff and salary.  Rhoades (1980) 
believes this is a short-sighted analysis since managers can use other expenses to achieve 
their overall aspirations, which may not only be about making more money.  In addition 
to income, Rhoades states that managers aspire for power and influence, prestige among 
peers, and pleasure.  Examples of expenses considered power and influence expenditures 
include number of employees, employee salaries, fringe benefits and publicity.  Prestige 
among peers can be captured in expenses such as charitable donations, furniture, office 
supplies, and occupancy costs.  Expenses categorized as pleasure include travel, 
entertainment, and memberships.   
Unlike previous studies that only look at payroll related expenditures, Rhoades 
believes that these expenses concerned with power, prestige and pleasure also need 
evaluation.  Rhoades evaluates two samples from 1976.  The first consists of 524 
commercial banks with detailed expense data and the second consists of 3,120 
commercial banks across many counties and markets with aggregate expense data.  
Rhoades runs a multivariate regression with market concentration as the main 
independent variable and multiple dependant variables.  The dependent variables 
represent various expenses expressed as a percentage of total assets.  Three dependent 
variables are also included for total assets to employees ratio.  Different categories of 
expenses include salary or furniture and equipment and different group of employees 
include total employees or administrative officers.  The analysis for the first group of 
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banks whose data was obtained from the Functional Cost Analysis program does not 
support expense preference behavior by managers.  The Functional Cost Analysis 
program was designed as a cooperative effort by all member banks and the Federal 
Reserve Banks to help develop a uniform cost accounting system for banking.  These 
results were anticipated since participation in the program could mean that the banks are 
already cost conscious since the data is publicly available.  Results of the second sample 
also reject expense preference behavior.  The market concentration ratio variable is 
significant but negatively related.  This shows that expenses are lower in high 
concentration markets (monopolies or oligopolies) than in low concentration 
(competitive) markets.  Since this data is in aggregate, Rhoades does not believe this 
sample is biased like the sample of 524.  The analysis of both samples rejects expense 
preference behavior by managers in the banking industry. 
Hannan and Mavinga (1980) further evaluate the Pennsylvania banks analyzed by 
Hannan (1979) by including an independent variable that they believe may by an 
indicator of expense preference behavior by managers.  They also evaluate additional 
expenses as possible indicators of management‟s behavior.  Hannan and Mavinga analyze 
a model in which the dependent variable is total salary and wage expense.  Additionally 
two other models are analyzed with furniture and equipment expense as the dependent 
variable in one and net occupancy costs as the dependent variable in the other.  Results of 
all three models show a positive and significant relationship between the dependent 
variable and the competitive nature variable.  This means that bank managers in less 
competitive markets may exhibit expense preference behavior.  Additional regression 
analysis is done with an independent variable for manager or owner-controlled banks.   A 
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firm is considered manager-controlled if no individual owns more than 10% of the 
common stock and is considered owner-controlled if the top shareholder owns over 25%.  
Banks in which one party owns between 10% and 25% of the shares are excluded from 
the study.  Only firms that operate in one market are included.  The results of the models 
indicate that managers in manager-controlled banks in less competitive markets exhibited 
expense preference behavior over owner-controlled banks for net occupancy costs and 
furniture and equipment expenses.  The model for total salaries and wages expense is not 
significant at the .10 level.   
Another study that evaluates expense preference behavior by analyzing competition 
and control of the firm is by Arnould (1985).  Arnould‟s dependent variable is the chief 
operating officer‟s (COO) salary and bonuses.  Moreover, to account for control of the 
firm, Arnould evaluates common stock owned by the entire board of directors, not just 
one party.  Two dummy variables are included.  One is if the board of directors owns less 
than 21% and one for 30% or less.  The number of shares of common stock owned by the 
COO was included in the original model but was not significant.  Banks which are part of 
a holding company are excluded since management control could not be determined.  
Findings show that manager-controlled banks in less competitive markets engage in 
expense preference behavior with regards to COO salary and bonuses.  A modified model 
which deleted the management control variable was also run to include the firms in which 
management control could not be determined.  In this model, managers in less 
competitive markets exhibit expense preference behavior over those in more competitive 
markets which is in line with results from the first analysis. 
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A number of studies evaluate the differences in management‟s behavior in mutual 
savings and loans (S&L) and stockholder S&Ls.  These studies use this distinction as an 
indicator of ownership structure.  Depositors in mutual S&Ls are considered members 
but they have no residual claim, do not have to pay a purchase price, have no 
responsibilities for management, cannot dissolve the company, and have no chance for 
profit or loss if they are insured.  Due to these characteristics, mutual S&Ls are 
considered to have a larger diffusion of ownership than stockholder S&Ls (Akella & 
Greenbaum, 1988).  Also with the diffusion of ownership, managers in mutual S&Ls do 
not face the same level of pressure as those in stock S&Ls so they may exhibit more 
expense preference behavior (Verbrugge & Jahera, 1981).  By not benefiting from the 
profits earned, managers may be enticed to spend more in perquisites to increase their 
benefit of running a successful firm (Verbrugge & Jahera). 
Verbrugge and Jahera run two OLS regression models.  The first examines 116 
California S&Ls with deposits over $10 million for 1974-1976 and the second examines 
330 S&Ls from California, Ohio and Texas.  The dependent variable is total salaries and 
wages for both models and the independent variables of concern are market concentration 
and ownership structure.  In the sample of California S&Ls, market concentration is not 
significant and the authors believe this is true due to the highly competitive nature of the 
entire market in the state.  Mutual associations do indulge in higher personnel costs than 
stock associations in the California sample.  This is consistent with operating results 
which show that return on assets (ROA) is lower for mutual S&Ls than for stock S&Ls.  
In the second sample, market concentration and ownership structure are only significant 
in 1 of the 3 years.  In all three years though, the interaction between ownership and 
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market concentration is significant and positively related to personnel costs.  This 
signifies that in less competitive markets, a manager of a mutual S&L may be more 
inclined to increase personnel costs than the manager of a stock S&L.   
To expand on this study, Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981) evaluate three additional 
dependent variables: total costs excluding interest and advertising, personnel costs, and 
personnel and occupancy costs.  These new variables are run for 126 banks in California 
and 50 in Los Angeles.  In Los Angeles, the ownership indicator is negative and 
significant in all models which may indicate that stock S&Ls spend less in expenses than 
mutual S&Ls.  For the California sample, two of the models show a significant negative 
relationship but the total costs excluding interest and advertising model does not.  The 
authors do not provide information on the number of employees or their salaries so they 
cannot determine if the preference by managers is for more staff or higher pay. 
Contradictory to the previous studies, Blair and Placone (1988) set out to show that in 
the U.S. S&L industry there is no evidence that a firm‟s competitiveness or their 
concentration in a particular market has any effect on the amount of expense preference 
behavior the managers may exhibit.  The authors utilize a sample of approximately 2,000 
U.S. S&L institutions for the years 1977-1982 in their regression analysis.  These firms 
are divided into quartiles based on size because there is an assumption that different size 
firms operate differently from each other.  Once again, personnel expenditures are the 
dependent variable and independent variables include the Herfindahl index as an 
indicator for market concentration and an indicator variable for ownership structure.  The 
market concentration variable was insignificant in all but the first few years for all size 
groups.  The first few years of the study occurred prior to the deregulation of the S&L 
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industry, which could be a factor requiring additional research.  The insignificance in the 
later years shows that there is no support for the belief that managers of firms with little 
competition exhibit expense preference behavior.  In terms of ownership structure, the 
results were insignificant for the largest banks and significant for the smaller three groups 
but negatively related.  The negative relationship shows that managers of stock S&Ls 
spend more than mutual managers on personnel expenditures.  The reason for this could 
not be isolated with further analysis. 
Mester (1989) acknowledges the fact that there are potential agency problems 
between stock S&Ls and mutual S&Ls, but studies the firms to understand if those 
problems are significant.  She evaluates 149 S&Ls in California in 1982 with total costs 
as the dependent variable.  This differs from most previous studies which were mainly 
concerned with personnel related expenses.  Mester‟s results are insignificant and fail to 
reject the hypothesis that mutual S&Ls are cost minimizers as compared to stock S&Ls.  
Carter and Stover (1991) take a different approach to compare the differences 
between ownership structures.  The authors study selected S&Ls that recently converted 
from mutual ownership to a stock association and look at the percentage of management 
ownership.  The level of management ownership is determined by evaluating all stock 
purchases during the conversion by managers and directors.  The three categories of 
ownership levels are 0%-15%, 15%-27%, and greater than 27%.  Carter and Stover 
hypothesize that higher and lower levels of ownership will have managers maximizing 
profits but that managers in the middle level will increase employee compensation.  
Results for the ownership variables show that the 0%-15% ownership variable is negative 
and significant, the 15%-27% ownership variable is positive and significant at the .10 
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level, and the ownership >27% variable is negative and significant at the .12 level.  The 
middle level may have a positive coefficient because managers at this level have enough 
power and influence to guarantee their jobs and they may be less concerned with their 
behaviors so they spend as they want.  As large shareholders, managers in the highest 
ownership range make more money as the company makes more money so they may be 
more profit driven.  Although it should be noted that these results are only significant at 
the .12 level and are not conclusive.   
In the case where all potential market participants may exhibit expense preference 
behavior, competition alone will not suffice to curb expense preference behavior (Akella 
& Greenbaum, 1988).  Akella and Greenbaum evaluate 386 S&Ls in California, Ohio and 
Texas and are concerned with ownership structure of the firm as the main indicator of 
expense preference behavior and not competition.  They find that the greater diffusion of 
ownership in mutual S&Ls allows management to exhibit expense preference behavior 
by expanding the output mix beyond profit maximizing levels.  The most likely reason is 
that there is less control and monitoring by owners in mutual S&Ls.   
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) take an opposite approach to the expense preference 
argument held by many before them.  They try to establish that due to market constraints, 
competition, contract specifications and monitoring managers that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the ultimate goal of managers and not increased utility like in the 
expense preference model.  The authors defend this by showing, like Akella and 
Greenbaum (1988), that being a monopoly does not necessarily lead to expense 
preference behavior.  Instead, wasteful spending can only occur in a monopoly if the 
managers are not owners and there is imperfect information and costly monitoring of 
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contracts.  Smirlock and Marshall (1983) present two hypotheses, the Profit Dissipations 
Hypothesis (PDH) and the Agency-Theoretic Hypothesis (ATH).  The PDH states that 
product market power, i.e. a monopoly, is what drives managers toward expense 
preference behavior. ATH states that further separation of ownership from management 
and greater hierarchy is what leads managers away from shareholder wealth maximizing 
behavior.  The authors run a regression analysis on approximately 125 banks and S&Ls 
with number of employees as the dependent variable and determine that it is ATH that 
leads to expense preference behavior, not just being a monopoly.  The evidence further 
suggests that firms are indeed shareholder wealth maximizers, not utility maximizers, but 
they are subject to agency costs which may lead to some expense preference behavior. 
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) are also concerned with firm size in their study.  They 
believe that previous studies have inadequately accounted for differences in 
organizational complexity so they attempt to address this by looking at firm size.  
Smirlock and Marshall state that the larger the firm, the more layered the organization 
and the more diffused the ownership will be which may allow managers to exhibit 
expense preference behavior.  They hypothesis that the larger the firm, the greater the 
amount of expense preference behavior.  Smirlock and Marshall show that as total assets 
increase, so does the level of labor expense.  Market concentration also becomes 
nonsignificant when addressing firm size.   
Williamson (1973) states the larger an organization the more likely managers will not 
operate as efficiently as smaller firms.  Williamson believes the larger span of control for 
managers can only be accomplished by sacrificing attention to detail which will lead to 
less efficiency.  Smirlock and Marshall (1983) support Williamson‟s (1973) belief that at 
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each level of an organization some expense preference behavior by subordinates will 
occur.  As the number of layers increase the amount of expense preference behavior 
throughout the organization will increase. 
Blair and Placone (1988) also acknowledge the fact that size can be a factor but they 
only use it to split their sample.  They do not include firm size as a variable.  Akella and 
Greenbaum (1988) find that diffusion of ownership may cause higher agency costs and 
expense preference behavior by managers even when the mutual firms are smaller.  In 
their sample, the average asset size for mutual S&Ls is $396 million while stock S&Ls 
are $533 million.  Akella and Greenbaum (1988) support Berle and Means (1932) who 
state that as the number of shareholders increase and ownership becomes more diffused, 
management is released of the goal of serving the shareholders.   
Expense preference behavior has been shown to exist in the highly regulated financial 
services industry under the following conditions: separation of ownership and control, 
costly monitoring of management, and lack of competition.  Blair and Placone (1988) 
find that in the earlier years of their study market concentration is significant, but that in 
later years it is not.  The change in significance occurred at the same time as deregulation 
in the S&L industry.  Blair and Placone mention that deregulation might be the reason for 
the change, but they do not conduct any further analysis.   
Gropper and Oswald (1996) study the deregulation issue which increased competition 
and decreased regulation in the mid-1980s for the banking industry.  They estimate that 
expense preference behavior by managers will decrease after deregulation.  Gropper and 
Oswald compare the period before and after deregulation, but unlike Hannan and 
Mavinga (1980) and Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981) they not only looked at personnel 
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related expenses, such as number of employees and compensation, but they also compare 
expenses such as occupancy and equipment costs.  Using multiple regression, Gropper 
and Oswald (1996) evaluate 1327 commercial banks from 1979-1980 and 904 from 
1985-1986.   Results show that all tested expenses, except furniture and equipment, 
decrease after deregulation.  Furniture and equipment expenses increase slightly.  After 
deregulation, total personnel decreases 3.2%.  This equates to between 4.3 and 5.3 full 
time equivalents.  These results not only show that deregulation decreases management‟s 
discretionary expenses, but also increases managerial efficiency.  Total assets, an 
indicator for firm size, are also positive and significant in all models. 
Gropper and Hudson (2003) also conduct a similar study of S&Ls before and after 
deregulation.  They hypothesize that the removal of the barriers to entry and hence 
increased competition will decrease the amount of expense preference behavior 
occurring.  Results confirm that after deregulation and the increase in competition, the 
level of expense preference behavior decreases.  Although Gropper and Hudson could not 
determine the exact cause of the decrease there was a definite decline in the later period.  
This supports other‟s conclusions that managers of regulated firms are more likely to 
increase shareholder wealth maximizing behavior with increased competition. 
While many studies support the belief that managers exhibit expense preference, only 
Gropper and Oswald (1996) and Gropper and Beard (1995) quantify the effect on firm 
operations.  Gropper and Beard (1995) try to quantify the costs of insolvency that occur 
due to managements‟ expense preference behavior.  They find that significantly higher 
levels of employee compensation and occupancy costs are associated with insolvency for 
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S&Ls.  The total cost of insolvency due to expense preference behavior was estimated to 
be $260 million in 1988. 
Most studies on expense preference behavior by managers have been conducted on 
commercial banks and savings and loan firms.  Table 2 is a summary of the studies from 
the banking industry that have been discussed.  Although results have been mixed, the 
majority find support for utility maximization by managers over shareholder wealth 
maximization.  Various dependant variables were evaluated with personnel related 
expenses and number of employees or hours as the most common.  The independent 
variables used in determining expense preference behavior are competition and 
ownership structure.  Competition is tested in some studies by evaluating market 
concentration and in others by looking at the effect of deregulation.  Results show an 
increase in competition leads to a decrease in expense preference behavior.  Moreover, 
firms that have a larger diffusion of ownership have a tendency to have a higher 
proportion of expenses which may be an indicator of expense preference behavior by 
managers. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Expense-Preference Literature in Banking  
Author(s)      
(Year) 
Dependent Variable(s) Indicator of expense-
preference behavior 
Expense-
preference 
found? 
Edwards (1977) Total wages and salaries; 
Total employees 
Dummy variable for critical 
concentration level ≥ 76% 
 
Yes 
Hannan (1979) Total wages and salaries; 
Total employees 
Dummy variable for three 
firm concentration ratio ≥ 
63% 
 
Yes 
Hannan & 
Mavinga (1980) 
Total wages and salaries; 
F&E; Net occupancy 
expenses 
 
Dummy variable for three 
firm concentration ratio ≥ 
63% 
 
Yes 
  Interaction between dummy 
variable for three firm 
concentration ratio ≥ 63% 
and dummy variable for 
manager control < 10% 
 
Yes  
Rhoades (1980) Salaries/TA; Fringe 
Benefits/TA; F&E/TA; 
Net Occupancy 
Expenses/TA; Total 
Operating Expense/TA; 
TA/Number of 
Employees* 
 
Three firm deposit 
concentration ratio 
No 
Verbrugge & 
Goldstein (1981) 
Total costs excluding 
interest and advertising; 
Personnel costs; 
Personnel and occupancy 
costs 
 
Dummy variable for form 
of organization 
Yes  
 
Verbrugge & 
Jahera (1981) 
Total salaries and wages Market concentration; 
stock-mutual dummy 
variable; interaction 
 
 
 
 
Yes  
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Author(s)      
(Year) 
Dependent Variable(s) Indicator of expense-
preference behavior 
Expense-
preference 
found? 
Smirlock & 
Marshall (1983) 
 
Total employees Size quartiles; dummy 
variable for three firm 
concentration ratio ≥ 55%; 
three firm concentration 
ratio 
 
No 
 Total employees Total assets Yes 
 
Arnould (1985) Chief operating officer 
salary and bonus  
Interaction between dummy 
variable for three firm 
concentration ratio > 63% 
and dummy variable for 
manager control ≤ 21% or 
30% 
 
Yes 
  Dummy variable for three 
firm concentration ratio > 
63%  
 
Yes 
Akella & 
Greenbaum (1988) 
 
Outputs Ownership structure Yes 
Blair & Placone 
(1988) 
Personnel expenditures Herfindahl index; dummy 
variable for form of 
organization 
 
No 
Mester (1989) Total costs Compare stock vs. mutual 
 
No 
Carter & Stover 
(1991) 
Officer and employee 
compensation 
Management ownership 
level 
 
Yes  
Gropper & Oswald 
(1996) 
Number of employees; 
Total compensation; 
Miscellaneous expenses; 
F&E; Occupancy 
expenses 
 
Dummy variable for 
deregulation; total assets 
Yes  
Gropper & Hudson 
(2003) 
Outputs Dummy variable for 
deregulation 
Yes 
Note: F&E – Furniture and equipment expenses; TA – Total Assets 
* Sampling of the models.  There were 17 models in total. 
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Expense Preference in Other Industries 
While most expense preference theory research analyzes commercial banks and 
S&LS, there have been additional studies in other industries.  The industries analyzed 
include hospitals, utilities, life insurance, and transportation.  Similar to the findings in 
banks and S&Ls, results vary in these other industries on whether or not managers exhibit 
expense preference behavior. 
Outside of banks and S&Ls, hospitals are the most studied industry for expense 
preference behavior.  Lewin, Derzon, and Margulies (1981) evaluate approximately 100 
measures for 53 hospitals in California, Florida, and Texas.  The categories include 
inpatient charges, inpatient payments, net patient revenue, inpatient costs, ancillary 
department costs, general service costs, markup ratios, net income, and uses and cost of 
resources.  To study expense preference behaviors by managers, only general service 
costs and uses and cost of resources are a concern.  The authors try to match each hospital 
with a closely comparable hospital with the main difference being one is investor-owned 
(proprietary) and one is a not-for-profit.  The analysis involves comparing means 
between the two groups to see if there is a significant difference.  Administrative and 
general expenses are significantly different between the groups.  Managers of investor-
owned facilities spend approximately 45% more than not-for-profits.  The only 
significant difference in the uses and cost of resources measure is the full-time-
equivalents (FTEs).  Not-for-profit hospitals use 14% more FTEs than investor-owned 
hospitals.  The only two significant variables, and the ones used in other expense 
preference behavior studies, show conflicting results.  In this sample, managers of not-for 
profit hospitals seem to have a preference toward payroll expenses but managers of 
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investor-owned hospitals appear to prefer general administrative costs.  This study, while 
trying to match hospitals as closely as possible, does not control for the differences in 
each.  
Another study of ownership structure in hospitals is conducted by Becker and Sloan 
(1985).  The authors analyze 2,231 U.S. community hospitals from 1979 using regression 
analysis.  The hospitals are coded into proprietary and non-for-profit and a third 
organizational structure, governmental.  Each of the three structures is further analyzed 
into independent hospitals, hospitals recently affiliated with a chain, and hospitals with a 
long-standing affiliation with a chain.  However, unlike Lewin et al. (1981), Becker and 
Sloan (1985) control for other firm differences besides ownership structure.  The 
regression models include control variables for differences such as size, teaching 
hospitals, casemix, Medicare and Medicaid proportions.  Once controlling for factors 
other than ownership, the authors find that ownership structure does not affect expenses.   
Oswald, Gardiner, and Jahera (1994) also study expense preference behavior by 
managers in hospitals with different ownership structures but are only concerned with 
proprietary and not-for-profits.  Oswald et al. hypothesize that expense-preference will be 
prevalent in not-for-profit hospitals when compared to proprietary hospitals.  The sample 
includes 210 not-for-profit hospitals and 160 proprietary hospitals from 1985-1988.  Six 
regression models are tested with the following dependent variables: salaries per 
discharge, full-time-equivalents (FTEs) per occupied bed, total assets per discharge, total 
costs per discharge, return on assets (ROA), and profit per discharge.  The independent 
variable of interest is the dummy variable for ownership which distinguishes between 
not-for-profit and proprietary hospitals.  In addition the models have six control variables 
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to adjust for changes in items such as Medicare, Medicaid, deductible mix, facility bed 
size, market share and Medicare case mix.  Results show that expenditures and assets are 
greater in not-for-profit hospitals than in proprietary hospitals, which supports expense 
preference theory.  FTEs per occupied bed are also significant and higher in not-for-profit 
hospitals but only in 1985.  As another validation of expense preference behavior, return 
on assets and profit per discharge are significantly lower in not-for-profit hospitals.  A 
further analysis shows the effect over time as the Prospective Payment System (PPS) is 
fully implemented.  The PPS established predetermined reimbursements levels for 
services for Medicare patients.  This may have caused hospitals to be more cost 
conscious and operate more efficiently.  By 1988, only two of the six dependent variables 
are significantly different based on ownership.  The reason for this may be that private 
insurance companies and the government hold hospitals accountable for costs and 
quality.  They are acting like shareholders. 
Carter, Massa, and Power (1997) analyze 185 hospitals in Texas with over 50 beds 
during 1989.  Models are employed using linear regression with dependent variables of 
administrative expenses, administrative salaries, and operating expenses.  Similar to 
Oswald et al. (1994), Carter et al. (1997) include other independent variable to control for 
size, competition, casemix, and medical services.  Pearson‟s correlation coefficients 
indicate that for profit hospitals have lower expenses than not-for-profit.  Results of the 
regression analysis show that total administrative expenses of proprietary hospitals are 
higher than those of non-proprietary hospitals.  On the other hand, administrative salaries 
and operating expenses are significantly less for proprietary.  Another significant finding 
is that administrative expenses decline with more competition regardless of ownership 
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structure.  Salaries and operating expenses are not significantly different if a hospital has 
competition or not.  Hospital size was also significant in all models showing that 
expenses increase as size increases.  Using the same independent variable, the authors 
also test the dependent variable of number of employees.  They find that for profit 
(proprietary) hospitals have fewer employees.  The data set is separated into three subsets 
based on size to see if economies of scale come into effect with larger hospitals.  The 
results show that size was not a factor and that economies of scale do not occur in the 
sample. 
The majority of hospitals between 1984 and 1990 were not-for-profit, rarely owned 
and operated by the same group of individuals, and had some amount of market power.  
Based on previous research, these factors are believed to lead to expense preference 
behavior by the managers.  Dor, Duffy, and Wong (1997) believe that while these factors 
are important, the management form is the main factor that will lead to expense 
preference behavior.  Management form is concerned with whether the hospital is 
operated with contract managers or salaried managers.  The authors believe that contract 
managers would spend less due to the fact that the board of trustees could terminate the 
contract if financial performance does not improve.  Three models with total costs, labor 
as a percentage of total costs, and capital as percentage of total costs as dependent 
variables are evaluated using nonlinear iteratively seemingly unrelated regression.  
Results show that as a hospital moves from salaried managers to contract managers, they 
are more inclined to use less amounts of labor and capital.  The authors then test whether 
contract managers actually use cost minimizing amounts of labor and capital.  Further 
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analysis fails to show that hospitals using contract management were cost minimizers at 
all times with all expenses.  Contract managers do minimize labor, but not capital. 
Similar to Dor et al., Carey and Dor (2008) evaluate hospital operating expenses 
before and after adopting management contracts.  Data is evaluated for hospitals that 
converted to the use of contract managers between 1991 and 1998.  The year considered 
pre-adoption is two years prior to the start of contract management and the year for post-
adoption is two years after implementing a contract.  This allows for a period of 
adjustment after adoption.  The sample includes 278 hospitals pre-adoption and 215 post-
adoption with 158 hospitals appearing in both samples.  The authors use nonlinear 
iteratively seemingly unrelated regression for two models.  The models include 
dependent variables of total operating costs and labor as a percentage of total costs.  
Results show that expense preference behavior declines significantly after the adoption of 
management contracts.   
Another industry that has been studied for expense preference behavior is utilities.  
Awh and Primeaux (1985) believe electric utility companies, like banks, are good 
candidates to test expense preference theory because they are highly regulated, of public 
interest, normally have a separation of ownership and management and are homogeneous 
in supply and demand conditions.   Their main concern is whether market structure 
affects the level of expense preference behavior.  This is tested with a dummy variable to 
indicate whether a firm is a monopoly or duopoly.  The dependent variable in the 
regression equation is total sales and administrative expenses.  While expense preference 
theory states that managers of firms in less competitive markets are more inclined to 
behave in ways that increase their utility rather than maximizing the wealth of the 
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owners, the authors find this to be untrue in the electric utility industry.  Results of the 
analysis show that sales and administrative expenses are lower in monopoly electric 
utility firms than they are in a duopoly firm, which face a direct competitor.  These 
results reject the notion of expense preference behavior on the part of managers.  The 
results are only significant at the .10 level.     
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1999) evaluate 295 chief executive officer (CEO) salaries 
from 1996 for various non-financial corporations to see if there is a significant difference 
in regulated industries.  The authors use linear regression with a dependent variable of 
salary as percentage of total compensation.  Total compensation is the sum of salary, 
bonus, and stock options. The main independent variable of concern is the dummy 
variable for regulation, which is set to 1 for regulated electrical firms and 0 otherwise.  
Results show that CEOs of regulated electric companies do not have their compensation 
structured in a way to curb expense preference behavior.  Most regulated electric utility 
firms‟ CEO compensation is in the form of salary and this is an increase of between 25-
29 percentage points over other industries.  Results also show that expense preference 
behavior is less of a concern in regulated industries because the regulations put 
constraints on costs and operations.  More regulation leads to less incentive to structure 
CEO compensation to curb expense preference behavior. 
The remainder of expense preference research that has been conducted on other 
industries is limited to only one or two studies in each industry.  Researchers have found 
evidence of expense preference behavior by managers in trucking and bus transit 
systems.  On the other hand, research concerned with airlines and life insurance firms has 
not supported expense preference behavior.  Although the following studies accept or 
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reject expense preference behavior by managers, there is only one in each industry so the 
results may not be generalizable to the entire industry.    
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996) suggest that managers of heavily regulated firms are 
more utility driven than managers of less regulated firms.  To evaluate this, the authors 
study the trucking industry and compare common carriers to contract carriers.  Common 
carriers provide freight services to a wide variety of commercial and residential 
customers and are typically more regulated than contract carriers who only serve a 
regular set of clients.  Regulators of common carriers only allow an increase in rates if 
there is a one-to-one change in operating ratio, which is defined as operating expenses 
divided by total revenue.  Common carriers may have an incentive to raise expenses so 
that the operating ratios increase and they can raise rates.  The authors analyze 80 
trucking companies that are for profit corporations with I.C.C. authority to engage in 
interstate transportation.  Data is evaluated using regression analysis from 1983 to 1986, 
providing a 320 data point sample.  The dependent variable is the percentage of costs 
accounted for by officers‟ wages plus fringe benefits.  Independent variables for firm size 
and non-recurring costs are included in addition to a dummy variable for regulation.  
Results show that common carriers engage in more expense preference behavior than 
contract carriers.  Also, results of the firm size variables show that larger firms exhibit 
more expense preference behavior in executive compensation than smaller firms.  The 
results support the hypothesis that common carriers, who are highly regulated, engage in 
higher levels of expense preference behavior than do contact carriers who operate with 
fewer regulations.   
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Obeng (2000) evaluates the U.S. public transit for expense preference behavior.  The 
author believes that due to the presence of subsidies, both operating and capital, that 
managers in this industry would be more inclined to exhibit expense preference behavior 
over shareholder wealth maximization.  Obeng believes that the subsidies may alleviate 
the pressure on managers to operate efficiently.  The sample consists of 493 U.S. bus 
transit systems from 1983 to 1992 and only includes firms in which they are the sole 
provider of services in a particular area.  When managers maximize utility, they show 
expense preference behavior for capital but not for labor. Results show an increase in 
costs of 14.73% which equates to an after subsidy cost increase of 29.12%.  The author 
believes that capital projects give a better public image and a sense of identity to the firm 
which is why managers favor capital over labor. 
One of the industries in which there is no known empirical support for expense 
preference behavior is airlines.  Hayashi and Trapani (1983) evaluate airlines because of 
the stringent regulations and the research findings in the banking industry that high 
regulations may lead to expense preference behavior by managers.  Also regulations in 
the airline industry include a maximum rate of return constraint which may entice 
managers to spend more to fall below this maximum.  Hayashi and Trapani use 
regression analysis to evaluate 17 domestic airlines under the regulation of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) for 1962 to 1972.  Results of the analysis show that airlines are 
primarily profit driven.  In the absence of the regulatory rate of return constraint variable 
though, managers have a tendency to exhibit expense preference behavior.     
Another industry in which expense preference behavior by managers has not been 
supported is life insurance firms.  Fields (1988), like many of the researchers in banking 
46 
 
and S&Ls, examines the effect of alternative ownership structures on expense preference 
behavior by managers in life insurance companies.  Based on previous findings in 
banking and utility companies, Fields chooses to study life insurance firms because they 
are competitive, have problems monitoring managers, and have different ownership 
structures.  Using regression analysis, 304 life insurance companies from 1984 are 
evaluated.  Of the 304, 204 are stock firms and 100 are mutual firms.  The dependent 
variable is costs and the primary independent variable is a dummy variable for 
organizational form. Independent variables are also included to account for size 
differences.  Results show that higher levels of output, in terms of number of policies, 
relate to higher costs.  The results for organizational form are not significant.  In firms 
where the owners have limited control over managers, there is no support of expense 
preference theory. 
Outside of the banking industry expense preference behavior has only minimally been 
tested.  Table 3 is a summary of the expense preference studies from industries outside of 
commercial banking and savings and loans.  The results of these tests have been mixed, 
but not enough testing has been done to generalize if there is support of expense 
preference behavior by managers.  More research needs to be conducted in these other 
industries to fully support or reject expense preference behavior by managers. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Expense-Preference Literature in Non-Banking  
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Industry Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Indicator of 
expense-
preference 
behavior 
Expense-
preference 
found? 
Williamson 
(1963) 
Various Compensation of top 
executive 
Four firm 
concentration 
ratio; Dummy 
variable for barrier 
to entry; General 
and administrative 
expenses 
 
Yes 
Lewin, Derzon, 
& Margulies 
(1981) 
Hospitals Administrative and 
general expenses; 
FTE 
 
Compare 
proprietary and 
not-for-profit 
Yes 
Becker & 
Sloan (1985) 
Hospitals Total expenses; Total 
revenue/total cost 
Ownership 
structure 
 
No 
Oswald, 
Gardiner, & 
Jahera (1994) 
Hospitals Salaries per 
discharge; FTE per 
occupied bed; Total 
assets per discharge; 
Total cost per 
discharge; Return on 
assets; Profit per 
discharge 
 
Ownership 
structure 
Yes 
Carter, Massa, 
& Power 
(1997) 
Hospitals Administrative 
expenses; 
Administrative 
salaries; Operating 
expenses; Number of 
employees 
 
Dummy variable 
for ownership 
structure; Dummy 
variable for 
competition 
Yes 
Dor, Duffy, & 
Wong (1997) 
Hospitals Total costs; 
Labor/total costs; 
Capital/total costs 
 
Dummy variable 
for management 
form 
 
 
 
Yes 
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Author(s) 
(Year) 
Industry Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Indicator of 
expense-
preference 
behavior 
Expense-
preference 
found? 
Carey & Dor 
(2008) 
Hospitals Total operating costs; 
Labor/total costs 
Comparison of pre 
and post 
outsourcing 
arrangements 
 
Yes 
 
Hayashi & 
Trapani (1983) 
Airlines Rate of return Regulatory 
constraint 
 
No 
Awh & 
Primeaux 
(1985) 
Utilities Total sales and 
administrative 
expenses 
Dummy variable 
for market 
structure 
 
No 
Fields (1988) Life 
insurance 
Total costs Dummy variable 
for ownership 
structure 
 
No 
Mixon & 
Upadhyaya 
(1996) 
 
Trucking Officer wages and 
benefits/total costs 
Dummy variable 
for regulation; 
firm size 
 
Yes 
Mixon & 
Upadhyaya 
(1999) 
 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Chief executive 
officer salary/chief 
executive officer total 
compensation 
 
Dummy variable 
for regulation 
Yes 
Obeng (2000) Public transit Elasticity of 
operating subsidies 
and capital subsidies 
 
Change in 
subsidies 
Yes 
Kim, Dalbor & 
Feinstein 
(2007) 
Restaurants Number of 
employees; Cost of 
business 
Dummy variable 
for management 
type; Dummy 
variable for 
ownership 
percentage 
 
Yes 
Upneja, Hua, 
Dalbor, & 
Repetti (2010) 
Restaurants Total other expenses Interest expense Yes 
Note: FTE – Full-time equivalents 
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Expense Preference in Hospitality 
The hospitality industry has recently been included in expense preference behavior 
research, but only a few have been completed.  There are only two known studies and 
both are concerned with restaurants.  Unlike the other industries which show mixed 
results, the two studies on hospitality show some support for the notion of expense 
preference behavior by managers. 
Kim, Dalbor, and Feinstein (2007) evaluate eating and drinking firms with a primary 
SIC code 58 from The 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances.  This data set only 
includes firms with fewer than 500 employees.  While there were 171 original firms, the 
authors exclude sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability partnerships (LLPs) 
and limited liability corporations (LLCs) due to tax differences.  This left a data set of 87 
firms.  The data is analyzed using three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple 
regression.  Two dependent variables are considered, number of employees and the cost 
of business.  Both of these are common expense preference indicators based on previous 
research.  The number of employees FTEs is standardized by the value of the firm‟s total 
assets.  The cost of business is calculated as the total cost to total sales ratio.  Independent 
variables include one for management type (owner-managed or outsider-managed) and 
one for ownership percentage.  Ownership percentage categories are where the primary 
owner owns 100%, over 50%, 50%, or under 50%.   
Results of the ANOVA show that type of management along with ownership 
percentage of the primary owner has a significant impact on the cost of doing business.  
Management type by itself is not significant, although ownership percentage is.  The cost 
of business is lowest for owner-managed firms with the manager owning 100%.  Also, 
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the cost of doing business is higher for firms with outside-managers where the primary 
manager owns 100% than when the primary owner owns less than 100%.  There is an 
inverse relationship between staff size and ownership percentage for owner-managed 
firms.  As the percentage of primary ownership decreases, the mean size of staff 
increases.  When the primary owner owns 100% of the firm, the size of staff is 
significantly higher for outside-manager firms than for owner-manager firms.  Results of 
the multiple regression analysis also show that costs and staff size are lower for owner-
managed firms when the ownership percentage of the primary owner increases.  
The second hospitality study is not concerned with ownership structure as a potential 
indicator of expense preference behavior, but instead evaluates management‟s reaction to 
a cost increase out of their control.  Upneja, Hua, Dalbor, & Repetti (2010) try to 
determine if management adjusts other expenses downward to compensate for a rise in 
interest expense, the uncontrollable expense.  If management does not control other 
expenses downward, they may be exhibiting expense preference behavior.  Again, 
restaurants are evaluated but this study examines publicly traded firms from 1963 to 
2007.  This study has the largest known time span on expense preference behavior.  Due 
to information availability limitations for publicly traded companies, total other expenses 
is used as the dependent variable and includes all expenses besides interest expense.  
Results of the multiple regression analysis show that as interest expense increases, so 
does other expenses.  Managers do not appear to be trying to control other expenses to 
offset the increase in interest expense.  This may be an indication of expense preference 
behavior by managers.    
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Expense preference behavior research in hospitality is relatively new and consists of 
only a few studies.  Results of the studies though are consistent and show that managers 
in hospitality organizations may be exhibiting expense preference behavior.  The results 
of these hospitality studies are summarized in Table 3 along with the other non-banking 
industries.  No known study has been done that examines hospitality personnel costs 
specifically.     
Expense Preference Theory Summary 
Table 4 summarizes the studies, dependent variables and significant independent 
variables that support expense preference behavior by managers.  The main indicators of 
expense preference behavior include separation between managers and owners, 
regulatory environment, and competition.   
Results of the studies that support expense preference behavior by managers typically 
have a high amount of separation between owners and managers.  This is tested by 
examining a variety of variables.  Some studies evaluate organizational structure while 
others look at firm size.  Organizational structure is analyzed in three different ways.  
Some researchers look at whether the firm is owner-controlled or manager-controlled, 
some analyze the difference between mutuals and stock associations and other evaluate 
differences between proprietary and not-for-profit firms.   
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Table 4 
Summary of Supporting Expense-Preference Literature  
Author(s) (Year) Findings that lead to expense-preference behavior 
Williamson (1963) Less competition; General and administrative expenses; 
high barriers to entry 
 
Edwards (1977) Less competition 
 
Hannan (1979) Less competition 
 
Hannan & Mavinga (1980) Less competition 
 
 Less competition and manager-controlled interaction 
 
Verbrugge & Goldstein 
(1981) 
 
Stock ownership 
Verbrugge & Jahera (1981) Mutual ownership; Less competition and mutual 
ownership interaction 
 
Lewin, Derzon, & Margulies 
(1981) 
 
Not-for-profit for payroll; Investor-owned for general 
administrative expenses 
Smirlock & Marshall (1983) Larger form size 
 
Arnould (1985) Less competition and manager-controlled interaction 
 
 Less competition 
 
Akella & Greenbaum (1988) Mutual ownership 
 
Carter & Stover (1991) Manager owns 15% - 27% of stock 
 
Oswald, Gardiner, & Jahera 
(1994) 
 
Not-for-profit (ownership structure) 
 
Gropper & Oswald (1996) Higher regulation; Larger firms 
 
Mixon & Upadhyaya (1996) Higher regulation; Larger firms  
 
Carter, Massa, & Power 
(1997) 
 
Proprietary for administrative expenses; Not-for-profit 
for administrative salaries and operating expenses; 
Larger firms 
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Author(s) (Year) Findings that lead to expense-preference behavior 
Dor, Duffy, & Wong (1997) Salaried managers 
 
Mixon & Upadhyaya (1999) Less regulation 
 
Obeng (2000) Subsidies 
 
Gropper & Hudson (2003) Higher regulation and less competition 
 
Kim, Dalbor, & Feinstein 
(2007) 
Owner-manager coupled with a decrease in ownership 
percentage; Outside-managers with primary ownership 
percentage under 100% 
 
Carey & Dor (2008) Salaried managers 
 
Upneja, Hua, Dalbor, & 
Repetti (2010) 
Increase in an uncontrollable expense 
 
Studies that evaluate firm control show that managers in firms that are manager-
controlled tend to exhibit more expense preference behavior than those in owner-
controlled organizations (Hannan & Mavinga, 1980; Kim et al., 2007).  The studies that 
evaluate separation of ownership based on whether the firm is a mutual or stock 
association find that mutuals have higher expense preference behavior by managers 
(Akella & Greenbaum, 1988; Verbrugge & Goldstein, 1981; Verbrugge & Jahera, 1981).  
Researchers that analyze proprietary versus not-for-profit organizations find that 
managers in not-for-profits exhibit higher expenses (Carter et al. 1997; Oswald et al. 
1994).  The final variable that is tested for separation of ownership is firm size and there 
is the belief that the larger a firm, the more separation of ownership and the more expense 
preference by managers.  Results show that as firm size increases so does expense 
preference behavior (Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al. 1997; Gropper & Oswald 1996; 
Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983; Williamson, 1973). 
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The level of regulation is also a factor in whether managers exhibit expense 
preference behavior.  A high amount of regulation generally leads to higher barriers to 
entry which may enable managers to spend more.  Williamson (1963) and Mixon and 
Upadhyaya (1996) find that more heavily regulated industries have higher expense 
preference behavior by managers.  Numerous studies also evaluate the effect of 
deregulation and find that deregulation decreases expenses (Blair & Placone, 1988; 
Gropper & Hudson, 2003; Gropper & Oswald, 1996).  With deregulation there are lower 
barriers to entry and typically more competition.   
Many researchers believe that the level of competition may be the variable that is 
actually effecting manager‟s behavior and not necessarily the amount of regulation.  
Research shows that a low level of competition or a high market concentration ratio may 
lead to more expense preference behavior by managers (Arnould, 1985; Carter et al., 
1997; Edwards, 1977; Hannan, 1979; Hannan & Mavinga, 1980; Williamson 1963).  
Competition is evaluated as a dichotomous dummy variable in some studies and as a 
continuous variable in others.   
The dependent variables studied that support expense preference behavior by 
managers are primarily concerned with personnel related expenses and general and 
administrative expenses within the control of the manager. The most commonly studied 
dependent variable though is employee compensation.  Some researchers are concerned 
with only executive compensation (Arnould, 1985; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1999; 
Williamson, 1963), while others evaluate total employee compensation (Carter & Stover, 
1991; Carter et al., 1997; Edwards, 1977; Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Hannan, 1979; 
Hannan & Mavinga, 1980; Oswald et al., 1994; Verbrugge & Goldstein, 1981; Verbrugge 
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& Jahera, 1981).  Many of these studies also analyze number of employees or employee 
hours in addition to payroll costs (Edwards, 1977; Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Hannan, 
1979; Kim et al., 2007; Oswald et al., 1994; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983). 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter reintroduces the research questions and the accompanying hypotheses.  
In the second part of this chapter the data will be discussed.  This will be followed by a 
discussion of the statistical tests used, the model and the dependent and predictor 
variables.  
Hypotheses 
There are three models being evaluated in this dissertation.  These models will be 
discussed in detail in the “Liner Regression Model” section of this chapter.  Model 1 uses 
the number of employees as the dependent variable, Model 2 uses salaries and wages as 
the dependent variable, and Model 3 uses total payroll expenses as the dependent 
variable.   
It is hypothesized that managers of Nevada gaming companies do not exhibit expense 
preference behavior for payroll related expenses.  This hypothesis corresponds to the first 
research question as stated in the introduction.  Payroll related expenses include number 
of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll.  The null hypothesis states that 
payroll related expenses in Nevada casinos for 1990 to 2010 are not affected by casino 
size, level of competition, or periods of economic recession.  The alternative hypothesis 
states that payroll related expenses in Nevada casinos for 1990 to 2010 are affected by at 
least one of the predictor variables of casino size, competition, and period of economic 
recession.  The null and alternative hypotheses are the same for all models.  The null and 
alternative hypotheses are stated as: 
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H10: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 
H1A: βi ≠ 0 for at least one i 
The remainder of the research questions are concerned with the predictor variables 
and not the overall model.  The first predictor variable of concern is total revenue and is 
used as a proxy for firm size and business volumes.  This variable corresponds to the 
second research question.  Previous studies show that payroll related expenses increase as 
firm size increases (Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983; Williamson, 
1973).  There is no reason to believe casino firms should be any different.  The null 
hypothesis is that number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll remain 
unchanged or decrease as casino size increases.  The alternative hypothesis is that number 
of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll increase as casino size increases.  The 
null and alternative hypotheses are stated as: 
H20: β1 ≤ 0 
H2A: β1 > 0  
The third hypothesis is concerned with competition and corresponds to research 
question three.  Expense preference behavior research shows that while controlling for all 
other variables, less competition leads to managers maximizing their own utility 
(Arnould, 1985; Edwards, 1977; Gropper & Hudson, 2003; Hannan, 1979; Hannan & 
Mavinga, 1980; Williamson, 1963).  Less competition equates to a higher market share.  
This dissertation examines the level of competition with a dummy variable of “1” if the 
market share is 63% of higher and “0” otherwise.  A dummy variable of “1” indicates 
lower competition.  While previous research using a dummy variable for competition 
have used 55%, 63% or 76% as the level in which to distinguish between low and high 
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levels of competition, 63% is the most commonly used percentage (Arnould, 1985; 
Hannan, 1979; Hannan & Mavinga; 1980).  The null hypothesis is that number of 
employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll will not change or will decrease as 
market share increases, holding all other variables constant.  The alternative hypothesis is 
that there is a positive relationship between number of employees and payroll expenses 
and competition.  The null and alternative hypotheses are stated as: 
H30: β2 ≤ 0 
H3A: β2 > 0 
Hypothesis four is concerned with the predictor variable for the period of economic 
recession.  A particular time period is defined as an economic recession when the 
majority of the fiscal year (more than 6 months) falls in the same time period as the 
National Bureau of Economic Research‟s recession dates (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010).  Fiscal years ended June 30, 2008 and 2009 are considered economic 
recessions.  During an economic recession and after controlling for the effect of the 
change in business volumes, managers should not need to adjust the number of 
employees or payroll related expenses.  Efficient managers should have already 
accomplished this due to the change in business volumes.  If managers are exhibiting 
expense preference behavior, they may decrease the number of employees or payroll 
expenses though since they may have been overstaffed during the non-recessionary 
period.  The null hypothesis is that during a period of economic recession, after 
controlling for changes in business volumes and competition, there should be no change 
or an increase in the number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that during a period of economic recession the number of 
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employees, salaries and wages and total payroll will decrease.  The null and alternative 
hypotheses are stated as: 
H40: β3 ≥ 0 
H4A: β3 < 0 
 Table 5 is a summary of the null hypotheses. 
 
Table 5 
Null Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesis 
1 Number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll are not 
affected by casino size, competition, or periods of economic recession. 
 
2 Number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll will remain 
unchanged or decrease as casino size increases. 
 
3 Number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll will remain 
unchanged or decrease as market share increases. 
 
4 Number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll will remain 
unchanged or increase during periods of economic recession. 
 
Data Collection 
Secondary data obtained from the Nevada State Gaming Control Board‟s Nevada 
Gaming Abstract is used for this dissertation.  The data is annual data for 21 fiscal years 
ending June 30 of each year for 1990 to 2010 (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1990-
2010).  This data is publicly available from the Nevada State Gaming Control Board‟s 
website (http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm).  Each Nevada casino with a 
nonrestricted gaming license and annual gaming revenue of $1 million or more is 
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included in this report.  A nonrestricted casino has more than 15 slot machines or 
includes any other game, a race book or a sports book.  This information is unaudited 
data provided to the state regulatory body by the casinos.  The data is aggregated into 
groupings using geographical region and size since by Nevada state law individual casino 
information is unavailable (Nevada Revised Statues ch. 41, 2009).  Each aggregate group 
of data is modified to be the average for each casino in that grouping.    
Linear Regression Model 
The data will be analyzed using multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
Multiple OLS regression is utilized when there is one dependent variable and two or 
more predictor variables.  This dissertation will include three multiple regression models 
that will be evaluated using SPSS.  The models have three separate dependent variables 
(Y): natural log of number of employees (Model 1), natural log of total salaries and 
wages (Model 2), and natural log of total payroll (Model 3).  Number of employees 
reported to the Nevada Gaming Control Board is the sum of the highest number of 
employees each month divided by the number of months in operation that year.  It is not 
full-time equivalents like some previous studies.   Total payroll includes total salaries and 
wages, payroll taxes and employee benefits.  Payroll taxes and benefits include expenses 
such as company portions of social security taxes, federal and state unemployment taxes, 
health insurance, vacation pay, union dues, 401K company matching, employee dining, 
and bonuses. While previous research has commonly used similar dependent variables, 
no known study included a model for salaries and wages and a separate model for salaries 
and wages plus taxes and benefits.  This dissertation will allow a comparison of the two 
to see if there is a difference. 
61 
 
The full model analyzed is: 
Yi = β0 + β1Rev +  β2Comp+ β3Rec +  εi 
Where 
Y = Natural log of dependent variable 
β  = Coefficients for each predictor variable 
Rev = Natural log of total revenue  
Comp = Dummy variable coded as “1” for a market share of 63% or higher and “0” 
otherwise 
Rec = Dummy variable coded as “1” for an economic recession period and “0” otherwise 
ε = Error term  
Total revenue is included as an indicator of size.  Size is included in this analysis for 
two reasons.  First, previous studies find that firm size measured by total revenue or total 
assets is significant in relation to payroll (Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al., 1997; 
Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983).  
Second, total revenue will be used to measure business volumes and as a control variable 
when evaluating the other predictor variables.   
Competition was also found to be significant in past studies and in this dissertation 
competition is based off the market share for each geographic region.  Level of 
competition is a dummy variable.  The dummy variable is “1” if the market share is 63% 
or higher and “0” otherwise.  Market share is calculated as the percent of revenue each 
aggregate group of casinos is accountable for in each market.  A dummy variable of “1” 
indicates lower competition. 
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The dummy variable for an economic recession will be “1” if the majority of the 
fiscal year (more than 6 months) falls in the same time period as the National Bureau of 
Economic Research‟s recession dates (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).  
Fiscal years ended June 30, 2008 and 2009 are coded as recessionary periods.  An alpha 
level of .05 will be used for statistical significance for all variables. 
Conclusion 
The research questions concerning whether managers of Nevada casinos exhibit 
expense preference behavior will be tested using multiple regression analysis.  Three 
models, each with a separate dependent variable representing number of employees, 
salaries and wages, and total payroll will be analyzed.  The predictor variables will 
include indicators of firm size, level of competition, and period of economic recession.  If 
each of the dependent variables is affected by the predictor variables, Nevada casino 
managers may be exhibiting expense preference behavior.  The next chapter presents the 
results and analysis of the models.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the data analysis based on 
the methodology provided in the previous chapter.  This chapter will first address the 
assumptions for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  Next, the regression models 
will be tested and refined for each of the three models.  Lastly, the results of the final 
models will be interpreted. 
Assumptions 
 For OLS there are four assumptions that must be met.  The assumption of normality 
of residuals is tested and the data is also verified for homoscedasticity.   Potential 
multicollinearity among predictors is also evaluated.  In addition, linearity between the 
continuous variables is also verified.  
 The assumption of normality of residuals is tested by evaluating the Q-Q plots of the 
standardized residuals for each model.  Figures 1, 2, and 3 are the Q-Q plots for each 
model.  There does not appear to be any serious departures from normality for any of the 
models.   
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Figure 1.  Q-Q plot of the standardized residuals for Model 1. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Q-Q plot of the standardized residuals for Model 2. 
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Figure 3.  Q-Q Plot of the standardized residuals for Model 3. 
 
After testing the normality assumption, the data is checked for homoscedasticity.  
This assumption tests whether the variance of errors is constant.  The standardized 
residuals are graphed against the standardized predicted values for each model and are 
shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6.  There are no serious violations to this assumption. 
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Figure 4.  Scatterplot of the standardized residuals and standardized predicted value for 
Model 1. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Scatterplot of the standardized residuals and standardized predicted value for 
Model 2. 
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Figure 6.  Scatterplot of the standardized residuals and standardized predicted value for 
Model 3. 
 
Multicollinearity is checked next by analyzing variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
each of the three models.  As shown in Table 6, no VIFs are over 1.2.  Since a VIF above 
10 is typically considered an indicator of multicollinearity, none of the three models have 
multicollinearity issues (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005).  The VIFs are the same 
for all three models. 
 
Table 6 
Variance Inflation Factors 
Predictor Variable VIF 
     Revenue 1.100 
     Market Share Dummy   1.099 
     Recession Dummy 1.002 
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The assumption of linearity is also verified by running scatterplots for each dependent 
variable against the predictor variable of revenue.  For each scatterplot a best fit line is 
added for recessionary and non-recessionary periods.  These scatterplots are shown in 
Figures 7, 8, and 9.  As can be seen in the scatterplot of Model 1, there are a few outliers.  
The scatterplot and results are rerun without the outliers and they are not significantly 
different.    
 
Figure 7.  Scatterplot of number of employees and revenue (Model 1). 
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Figure 8.  Scatterplot of total salaries and wages and revenue (Model 2). 
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Figure 9.  Scatterplot of total payroll and revenue (Model 3). 
 
Regression Analysis Results 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 7.  Revenue per property has 
a mean of $64.4 million and a standard deviation of $98.0 million.  The number of 
employees has a mean value of 802 with a standard deviation of 893.  Salaries and wages 
has a mean value of $16.06 million and a standard deviation of $22.41 million.  Total 
payroll, which includes salaries, wages, taxes, and benefits, has a mean value of $22 
million and a standard deviation of $31.88 million.  Additional descriptive statistics by 
year are shown in Table 8.  These descriptive statistics are in total for all nonrestricted 
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Nevada casino properties earning over $1 million a year in gaming revenue.  Figure 10 is 
a graph of the descriptive data from Table 8.   
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Employees 352 73.00 4,308.00 802.08 892.67 
Revenue * 352 4.03 636.53 64.39 97.97 
Salaries and Wages* 352 1.23 135.24 16.06 22.41 
Total Payroll* 352 1.48 191.93 22.00 31.88 
Note. * in millions of dollars 
 
The Pearson correlation between number of employees and revenue is .96.  The 
Pearson correlation between „salaries and wages‟ and revenue is .99.  The Pearson 
correlation between total payroll and revenue is also .99.  All correlations are significant 
at the .001 level.  Since Pearson correlation between a continuous variable and a nominal 
variable are typically not meaningful, these correlations are not discussed.   
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics by Year 
Year 
 Total 
Revenue 
Total 
Employees 
 Total Salaries 
and Wages 
Total 
Payroll 
Number of 
Properties 
1990   $     8,215.1  151,779   $     2,180.9   $     2,896.7  182 
1991   $     9,017.2  152,119   $     2,794.1   $     3,598.6  198 
1992   $     9,153.6  155,962   $     2,406.5   $     3,254.9  192 
1993   $     9,621.2  145,942   $     2,460.0   $     3,324.9  189 
1994   $   10,896.8  165,149   $     2,785.4   $     3,798.7  207 
1995   $   11,995.4  170,239   $     3,051.5   $     4,137.2  213 
1996   $   12,803.9  186,103   $     3,263.9   $     4,420.2  229 
1997   $   13,285.4  188,405   $     3,407.2   $     4,619.8  235 
1998   $   13,870.0  182,429   $     3,557.4   $     4,827.8  234 
1999   $   15,392.4  198,992   $     3,908.1   $     5,309.9  238 
2000   $   17,557.3  204,874   $     4,346.2   $     5,957.4  243 
2001   $   18,103.4  205,151   $     4,393.4   $     6,112.8  247 
2002   $   17,301.8  191,759   $     4,300.5   $     6,020.5  249 
2003   $   17,978.2  192,812   $     4,389.2   $     6,188.3  256 
2004   $   19,586.1  191,620   $     4,559.8   $     6,503.1  258 
2005   $   21,356.2  202,209   $     4,949.4   $     7,016.9  268 
2006   $   24,081.1  215,041   $     5,305.0   $     7,482.2  274 
2007   $   25,257.0  201,953   $     5,477.3   $     7,707.9  270 
2008   $   25,004.8  202,216   $     5,563.4   $     7,755.6  266 
2009   $   22,011.4  177,397   $     5,108.5   $     7,133.1  260 
2010   $   20,853.6  175,024   $     5,028.6   $     6,978.9  256 
Note. Total revenue, total salaries and wages and total payroll are in millions. 
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Figure 10.  Line graph of revenue, employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll for 
Nevada casinos for 1990 – 2010. 
 
Number of Employees (Model 1) 
As can be seen in Table 9, 93.8% of the variance in the natural log of employees is 
accounted for by the natural log of revenue, the dummy variable for market share and the 
dummy variable for a recessionary period.  R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are the same for the first 
model.  Table 10 is the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table and shows this model is 
significant in explaining the variance, F(3,348) = 1,761.43, p < .0005.  The null of 
hypothesis 1 is rejected, which indicates that managers of Nevada casino companies may 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
D
o
ll
ar
s 
in
 M
il
li
o
n
s
Revenue Salaries & Wages Total Payroll Employees
74 
 
be exhibiting expense preference behavior in terms of number of employees.  Table 11 
presents the regression results of Model 1 in which the dependent variable is the natural 
log of number of employees.   
 
Table 9 
Model 1 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.969 .938 .938 .248 
 
Table 10 
ANOVA Table for Model 1 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 324.574 3 108.191 1761.425 .000* 
Residual 21.375 348 0.061   
Total 345.949 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Employees) 
* p < .0005 
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Table 11 
Regression Coefficients for Model 1 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -8.442 .205  -41.254 .000* 
Ln(Revenue) 0.853 .012 0.983 70.327 .000* 
Market Share Dummy -0.120 .030 -0.055 -3.963   >.500 
Recession Dummy -0.352 .046 -0.102 -7.643 .000* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Employees) 
* p < .0005 
 
The market share dummy variable is not significant for a one tailed test since the null 
hypothesis is that there is a non-positive relationship between market share and number 
of employees.  Since the t-value is negative and the corresponding significance is larger 
than 0.500, the null of hypothesis 3 is not rejected.  This indicates that casino firms in 
Nevada do not have a significantly larger number of employees based on whether their 
market share is 63% or higher.  The results show that as market concentration increases, 
number of employees decreases.  This is the opposite of what many previous expense 
preference studies find (Arnould, 1985; Carter et al., 1997; Edwards, 1977; Hannan, 
1979; Hannan & Mavinga, 1980; Williamson 1963).  This finding does support what 
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) find that when including firm size as a potential factor, 
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market concentration becomes nonsignificant.  The model is also modified and run with 
competition as a continuous variable as the number of competitors in the geographic 
market and results are the same with total competitors being nonsignificant. 
The model is rerun without this variable.  Tables 12 and 13 show the model summary 
and ANOVA table for the final Model 1 with the dependent variable of natural log of 
employees.  The full model is still significant, F(2,349) = 2,527.76, p < .0005, with 
93.5% of the variance in the natural log of employees being accounted for by the natural 
log of revenue and the recession dummy variable.  Table 14 is the regression results of 
the final model. 
 
Table 12 
Final Model 1 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.967 .935 .935 .253 
 
Table 13 
ANOVA Table for Final Model 1 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 323.609 2 161.805 2527.785 .000* 
Residual 22.340 349 0.064   
Total 345.949 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Employees) 
* p < .0005 
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Table 14 
Regression Coefficients for Final Model 1 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -8.278 .205  -40.461 .000* 
Ln(Revenue) 0.839 .012 0.966 70.971 .000* 
Recession Dummy -0.355 0.47 -0.103 -7.561 .000* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Employees) 
* p < .0005 
 
Based on the significance of the predictor variable for the natural log of revenue, the 
null of hypothesis 2 is rejected and signifies that as revenue increases the number of 
employees also increases.  As a casino firm gets larger they have a tendency to have more 
employees which may be an indicator of expense preference behavior by managers based 
on prior research (Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al., 1997; Gropper & Oswald, 1996; 
Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983).  The thought that higher 
revenue may lead to more expense preference behavior by managers is because the larger 
the firm the more separation and layers between owners and managers (Smirlock & 
Marshall, 1983).  Another reason, and probably a more valid reason in hospitality firms, 
could be that as firms increase in size and generate more revenue, they require more 
employees to produce that revenue.  Managers may not be exhibiting expense preference 
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behavior in that case.  This predictor variable is still significant though to control for 
revenue changes when evaluating the other variables.   
The coefficient of the natural log of revenue from Table 14 is 0.839 which indicates 
that for each 1% increase in revenue, the number of employees increases 0.84%.  Based 
on the mean revenue for Nevada casino firms and the mean number of employees from 
the descriptives in Table 7, a 1% increase in revenue equates to $643,000 and a 0.84% 
increase in employees is 6.7 employees. Over the entire sample period, each employee 
generates approximately $80,000 in revenue but for each 1% increase in revenue each 
additional employee generates approximately $96,000 in revenue.  The additional 
employees produced more revenue than the average employee over the 21 year period 
analyzed.  Smaller properties may have a higher percentage of fixed employees so the 
increase in revenue generates more income per employee, but more research should be 
done to determine the reason for the difference.    
The coefficient of the recession dummy variable is also significant so the null of 
hypothesis 4 is rejected and signifies that during a recessionary period, casino firms 
decrease the number of employees they employ after controlling for firm size.  Table 14 
shows the coefficient of the recession dummy variable as -0.355, which indicates that 
during a recessionary period casino firms decrease the number of employees 35.5%.  This 
decrease is after taking into account the decrease in employees that occurred due to the 
change in revenue from lower business volumes.  Since Nevada casino firms over the last 
21 years had an average of 802 employees, the 35.5% decrease equates to 285 
employees.  This may be an indication of expense preference behavior by manager during 
non-recessionary periods.   
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If casino firms are able to decrease the number of employees nearly 36% during a 
recession, above and beyond what already occurred due to the decrease in business 
volumes, they may have been overstaffed originally because they were able to decrease 
staff more than the decrease in revenue warranted.  If managers are operating efficiently 
during non-recessionary periods they can accomplish the decrease in employees by just 
accounting for the decrease in revenue.  During the recession, managers may be 
decreasing employees more than necessary, but the recession studied was 2 years long so 
this is likely not the cause of the significant difference.  More research should be done 
years after the recession to see if management maintains the efficiencies they did during 
the recession.   
Salaries and Wages (Model 2) 
 As shown in Table 15, 98.1% of the variance (R
2
 and adjusted R
2
) in the natural log 
of salaries and wages is accounted for by the natural log of revenue, the dummy variable 
for market share and the dummy variable for a recessionary period.  Results of the 
ANOVA in Table 16, show this model is significant in explaining the variance, F(3,348) 
= 5,901.54, p < .0005.  Similar to Model 1, the null of hypothesis 1 is rejected, which 
may indicate that managers of Nevada casino companies may be exhibiting expense 
preference behavior in terms of total salaries and wages.  Table 17 presents the regression 
results of Model 2 in which the dependent variable is the natural log of salaries and 
wages. 
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Table 15 
Model 2 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.990 .981 .981 .155 
   
Table 16 
ANOVA Table for Model 2 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 425.393 3 141.798 5901.542 .000* 
Residual 8.361 348 0.024   
Total 433.755 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Salaries and Wages) 
* p < .0005 
 
Similar to the results from Model 1, the market share dummy variable is not 
significant so the null of hypothesis 3 is not rejected.  The model was rerun without this 
variable.  Tables 18 and 19 show the model summary and ANOVA table for the final 
Model 2 with the dependent variable of natural log of salaries and wages.  The full model 
is still significant, F(2,349) = 7,589.44, p < .0005, with 97.8% of the variance (R
2
) in the 
natural log of salaries and wages accounted for by the natural log of revenue and the 
recession dummy variable.  Table 20 shows the coefficients for the final Model 2. 
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Table 17 
Regression Coefficients for Model 2 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -0.866 .128  -6.766 .000** 
Ln(Revenue) 0.979 .008 1.007 129.004 .000** 
Market Share Dummy -0.144 .019 -0.059 -7.599   >.500 
Recession Dummy -0.073 .029 -0.019 -2.523 .012* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Salaries and Wages) 
* p < .05; ** p < .0005  
 
Table 18 
Final Model 2 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.989 .978 .977 .167 
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Table 19 
ANOVA Table for Final Model 2  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 424.006 2 212.003 7589.441 .000* 
Residual 9.749 349 0.028   
Total 433.755 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Salaries and Wages) 
* p < .0005 
 
Table 20 
Regression Coefficients for Final Model 2 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -0.669 .135  -4.953 .000** 
Ln(Revenue) 0.961 .008 0.989 123.162 .000** 
Recession Dummy -0.077 .031 -0.020 -2.472 .014* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Salaries and Wages) 
* p < .05; ** p < .0005  
 
The null of hypothesis 2 is rejected and signifies that as revenue increases total 
salaries and wages also increases.  Similar to Model 1, as a casino firm gets larger they 
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have a tendency to have more salaries and wages expenses.  This is expected since as 
explained in Model 1, more revenue requires more employees and increased salaries and 
wages to produce the additional revenue.  Based on Table 20, the coefficient of the 
natural log of revenue is 0.961 which indicates that for each 1% increase in revenue, total 
salaries and wages increase 0.96%.  The 1% increase in revenue, which is $634,000 
based on the mean of revenue, corresponds to a $154,000 increase in salaries and wages, 
based on the mean salaries and wages from Table 7.  According to Model 1, casino firms 
hire 6.7 more employees, but only incur $154,000 in additional salaries and wages for 
each 1% increase in revenue.   
The null of hypothesis 4 is also rejected and signifies that during a recessionary 
period, casino firms decrease total salaries and wages expense after controlling for firm 
size.  Table 20 shows the coefficient of the recession dummy variable as -0.077, which 
indicates that during recessionary a period casino firms decrease salaries and wages 
expense 7.7%.  Based on the mean salaries and wages from Table 7, a 7.7% decrease 
equates to $1.2 million.  Based on results of Model 1, casino firms decrease 285 
employees but only decrease salaries and wages $1.2 million during recessionary periods.  
This equates to only $4,000 per employee.  It is not known if the decrease in salaries and 
wages came from the loss of 285 employees, less hours, or pay cuts.  While further 
research needs to be conducted to better understand this change, results of Model 2 show 
that casino firms are able to decrease salaries and wages expense beyond the level 
necessary for just decreased business volumes during the recession, which may be a sign 
of expense preference behavior by managers during non-recessionary periods.   
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Total Payroll (Model 3) 
Tables 21 and 22 provide the model summary and ANOVA table for Model 3 in 
which the dependent variable is the natural log of total payroll.  As shown in Table 21, 
98.8% of the variance (R
2
 and adjusted R
2
) in the natural log of total payroll is accounted 
for by the natural log of revenue, the dummy variable for market share and the dummy 
variable for the recession period.  This model is significant in explaining the variance, 
F(3,348) = 9,333.32, p < .0005.  Similar to results of Model 1 and 2, the null of 
hypothesis 1 is rejected, which indicates that managers of Nevada casino companies may 
be exhibiting expense preference behavior in terms of total payroll.  The regression 
results of Model 3 in which the dependent variable is the natural log of total payroll are 
shown in Table 23.   
 
Table 21 
Model 3 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.994 .988 .988 .127 
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Table 22 
ANOVA Table for Model 3 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 454.123 3 151.374 9333.316 .000* 
Residual 5.644 348 0.016   
Total 459.767 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Total Payroll) 
* p < .0005 
 
Table 23 
Regression Coefficients for Model 3 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -1.124 .105  -10.692 .000** 
Ln(Revenue) 1.009 .006 1.009 161.885 .000** 
Market Share Dummy -0.129 .016 -0.052 -8.284 >.500 
Recession Dummy -0.048 .024 -0.012 -2.029 .043* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Total Payroll) 
* p < .05; ** p < .0005  
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Similar to results from Models 1 and 2, the market share dummy variable is not 
significant so the null of hypothesis 3 is not rejected.  The model is rerun without this 
variable and Tables 24 and 25 show the model summary and ANOVA table for the final 
Model 3 with the dependent variable of natural log of total payroll.  The final model is 
still significant, F(2,349) = 11,698.69, p < .0005, with 98.5% of the variance (R
2
) in the 
natural log of total payroll being accounted for by the natural log of revenue and the 
recession dummy variable.  Table 26 shows the coefficients for the final model after 
removing the nonsignificant variable. 
 
Table 24 
Final Model 3 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.993 .985 .985 .139 
 
Table 25 
ANOVA Table for Final Model 3 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 453.010 2 226.505 11698.694 .000* 
Residual 6.757 349 0.019   
Total 459.767 351    
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Total Payroll) 
* p < .0005 
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Table 26 
Regression Coefficients for Final Model 3 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -0.948 .113  -8.428 .000** 
Ln(Revenue) 0.993 .006 0.993 152.880 .000** 
Recession Dummy -0.052 .026 -0.013 -1.998 .046* 
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Total Payroll) 
* p < .05; ** p < .0005  
 
The null of hypothesis 2 is rejected and signifies that as revenue increases total 
payroll also increases.  As shown in the results of Model 2, salaries and wages increase as 
firm size increases so it is expected that total payroll will also increase since salaries and 
wages are the largest portion of total payroll.  Table 26 shows the coefficient of the 
natural log of revenue as 0.993, so for each 1% increase in revenue, total payroll 
increases 0.99%.  Based on the means of revenue and total payroll from Table 7, an 
increase of 1% in revenue equates to $643,000 and an increase of 0.99% in total payroll 
equals $218,000.  The $64,000 difference between the increase in salaries and wages and 
the increase in total payroll is due to taxes and benefits.   
For the period under study, taxes and benefits are 37% of salaries and wages.  In 
larger firms, for each 1% increase in revenue, taxes and benefits are 41.6% of salaries and 
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wages for the additional expense.  It is not known whether just payroll taxes increased 
due to higher corporate tax rates or if benefits also increased.  It may also be a 
combination of both, but more research needs to be conducted to understand the 
difference in the percentages.  The results support previous research though that shows 
larger firms spend more in payroll related expenses.     
The null of hypothesis 4 is also rejected and signifies that during a recessionary 
period, casino firms decrease total payroll expenses.  During recessionary periods, casino 
firms decrease total payroll expenses 5.2%, which is the coefficient of the natural log of 
revenue from Table 26.  Based on the mean of total payroll from Table 7, the decrease of 
5.2% equates to $1.1 million.  This expense savings is less than the $1.2 million in 
salaries and wages alone.  There could be a variety of reasons that total payroll decreases 
less than salaries and wages.  One reason could be that during recessionary periods, 
corporate tax rates increase or more benefits are given which could have caused benefits 
to increase and offset some of the decrease in salaries and wages.  Benefits may be 
increasing due to union contracts which for Nevada casinos are 5 to 10 year contracts 
(Stutz, 2007).  These contracts may have benefit increases built into them when they are 
signed (Stutz, 2007).  Management may not have the ability to alter these benefits 
without union approval.  Another explanation may be that benefits are taken away during 
the recession and are not given back to employees after the recessionary periods end.  
More research would need to be done to understand how salaries and wages can decrease 
more than total payroll.  Results of Model 3 show that casino firms are able to decrease 
total payroll expenses during recessionary periods beyond the level necessary for just 
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decreased business volumes.  Model 3 further supports potential expense preference 
behavior by Nevada casino managers during non-recessionary periods.   
Hypotheses Summary 
 For Nevada casinos, all three models evaluated produce similar results for all four 
hypotheses.  The amount of payroll related expenses and number of employees is affected 
by casino size, level of competition, and recessionary periods.  Previous research finds 
that these variables may be indicators of expense preference behavior by managers.  The 
conclusion rejects the null of hypothesis 1.  By rejecting the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference, the results of this dissertation may provide evidence of expense preference 
behavior in the Nevada gaming industry.   
Hypothesis 2 was concerned with whether firm size affects the number of employees 
or payroll related expenses.  Results show that firm size in Nevada casinos is a factor in 
payroll expenses.  This dissertation rejects the null hypothesis that payroll related 
expenses or number of employees remains the same or decreases as a casino increases in 
size.  All dependent variables, number of employees, salaries and wages, and total 
payroll, increase as total revenue increases.  Previous research shows that larger firms 
may spend more in payroll because the owners are more separated from management the 
larger the operation.  For casino firms, the variable is used as a control variable since it is 
expected that payroll related expense will increase as  revenue increases since more 
business volumes require more employees. 
The third hypothesis involved the level of competition.  Expense preference research 
has shown that less competition and higher market share percentage may lead to more 
utility maximization behavior by managers than shareholder wealth maximization 
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behavior.  Results of all three models fail to reject the null hypotheses that payroll will 
decrease or remain unchanged as market share increases.  Number of employees and 
payroll related expenses decrease for Nevada casinos that have a market share of 63% or 
higher.  After determining that this variable was nonsignificant, it was removed and all 
models are rerun.  Results are not significantly different under the final models for the 
other predictor variables after removal of this variable.  
The final hypothesis tested is concerned with the affect of recessionary periods on 
payroll related expenses.  All three models reject the null hypothesis that a recessionary 
period does not change or may even increase payroll related expenses.  As shown in 
Table 27, all dependent variables decrease during a recessionary period after taking into 
account changes due to business volumes.  This may be an indication that managers of 
Nevada casinos are exhibiting expense preference behavior during non-recessionary 
periods.   
 
Table 27 
Effects of Recessionary Periods on Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable Mean % Change $ Change 
Number of Employees 802.1 -35.5% -284.7 
Salaries and Wages* $16.1 -7.7% -$1.2 
Total Payroll* $22.0 -5.2% -$1.1 
Note. * in millions  
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If casino firms are able to decrease all payroll related expenses during a recession, 
above and beyond what already occurred due to the decreased business volumes, they 
may be overstaffed or spending too much during non-recessionary periods. If managers 
are operating efficiently during non-recessionary periods they would be able to 
accomplish the decrease in employees and payroll expenses by just adjusting for the 
decrease in business volumes.     
Conclusion 
The three models discussed in the previous chapter are analyzed using OLS multiple 
regression in SPSS.  Results for each hypothesis are consistent across all three models.  
All models show that number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll in 
Nevada casinos are affected by casino size and recessionary periods.  All models also 
show a significant positive relationship with firm size.  As casinos increase in size or 
business volumes, payroll related expenses also increase.  The final variable that is 
significant was recessionary period.  During recessionary periods, number of employees 
and payroll expenses decrease after controlling for changes in business volumes.  These 
results show that Nevada casino managers may be exhibiting expense preference 
behavior in larger casinos and during non-recessionary periods.  The next section will 
discuss limitations, managerial and academic implications, and potential future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 This chapter will focus on the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the 
study and the implications of those results.  The limitations of the study and 
recommendations for future research will also be discussed.  The main purpose of this 
research is to evaluate whether managers of Nevada casinos exhibit expense preference 
behavior over shareholder wealth maximization behavior.  The research questions are 
concerned with whether a casino‟s size, market share or an economic recession affected 
the number of employees and payroll related expenses. 
 The study evaluates aggregate annual data from the Nevada Gaming Control for fiscal 
years 1990 to 2010.  Based on a thorough literature review of expense preference 
behavior, OLS multiple regression analysis was chosen to evaluate Nevada casinos.  
Three models are run with dependent variables for number of employees, salaries and 
wages, and total payroll.  Predictor variables include total revenue, a dummy variable for 
market share and a dummy variable for recessionary periods. 
Findings 
 Findings from the three models are consistent for all predictor variables.  In each 
model, the market share dummy variable is not significant based on a one-tailed test.  The 
coefficient was negative, which indicates that managers of Nevada casinos decrease 
number of employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll as market share increases and 
competition decreases.  This fails to reject null hypothesis 3.  All models are rerun 
without this predictor variable to obtain final models.   
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All final models explain at least 93.5% of the variance in the dependent variables.  
Model 1 explains 93.5% of the variance in the natural log of employees with the natural 
log of revenue and the recession dummy variable.  Model 2 uses the natural log of 
salaries and wages as the dependent variable and Model 3 uses the natural log of total 
payroll.  The two predictor variables, the natural log of revenue and the recession dummy 
variable, explain 95% of the variance in each model.  
As casino firms increase in size and produce more revenue, they have more payroll 
related expenses.  For each 1% increase in revenue, casinos hire 0.84% more employees, 
spend 0.96% more in salaries and wages and incur 0.99% more in total payroll expense.  
As Nevada casinos generate $643,000 in additional revenue they hire 6.7 more 
employees.  These additional employees each generate $96,000 in revenue. Casino 
managers also spend an additional $154,000 in salaries and wages and $218,000 in total 
payroll.  Prior research shows that as firms increase in size, it is more likely for managers 
to exhibit expense preference behavior (Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al., 1997; 
Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983).  
Moreover, as casinos increase in size they require more employees and more payroll 
expenses to provide the service necessary to produce the additional revenue. 
During recessionary periods Nevada casinos decrease the number of employees and 
payroll related expenses.  These decreases occur even after controlling for the decreases 
due to lower business volumes.  Casinos decrease the number of employees 35.5% during 
recessionary periods on average.  They also decrease salaries and wages 7.7% and total 
payroll 5.2%.  These decreases equate to 285 employees, $1.2 million in salaries and 
wages and $1.1 million in total payroll.  If casinos managers are able to decrease payroll 
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related expenses during recessionary periods beyond the level necessary for the lower 
business volumes, they may be operating inefficiently during non-recessionary periods.  
This may be an indication that managers are exhibiting expense preference behavior 
during non-recessionary periods. 
Implications of Findings 
 The findings of this dissertation have both academic and managerial implications.  An 
academic implication is that this study adds to the previous literature on expense 
preference behavior.  This dissertation is also the first known study that evaluates 
recessionary periods and management‟s response to economic downturns in relation to 
expense preference behavior.  This is also the only known study on expense preference 
behavior in the gaming industry and only the third study in hospitality.   
 The managerial implications show casino managers and owners that they are 
overstaffed during non-recessionary periods.  This is important for many reasons.  One 
reason is that more money is being spent on payroll related expenses that could be paid to 
owners in the form of dividends or used for growth of the properties, both of which 
would increase shareholders wealth.  The additional cash savings could also be used to 
borrow less if the company was borrowing to grow.  It could also be saved and used in 
times when the company had low or negative EBITDA as was the case for fiscal years 
ending June 30, 2009 and 2010. 
 Another managerial implication about being overstaffed during non-recessionary 
periods concerns union contracts.  Nevada casinos typically sign 5 or 10 year union 
contracts (Stutz, 2007).  By signing these contracts when the casinos are already 
overstaffed they are committing to using a higher level of staffing than is required as was 
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the case in 2007 when many Nevada casinos signed new union contracts.  When revenue 
and business volumes are increasing every year this is not a concern because the casinos 
need the employees and maybe more as business volumes continue to rise.  When 
business volumes suddenly decrease and casinos have committed to giving employees a 
certain level of hours and benefits, management does not have as much flexibility to 
adjust.  If they were staffed at the right level to begin with, they would not have to cut as 
drastically. 
 This dissertation can be used as a basis for theory and a beginning model for 
individual casinos to evaluate their own payroll related expenses.  Individual casinos 
could implement a time series model based of this dissertation with monthly data and 
more detailed payroll expenses.  Fixed and variable positions or management and hourly 
employees could be evaluated separately to see if one category of employees is treated 
differently.  Casino management could evaluate their property as compared to the results 
of this dissertation to see if they adjusted differently or not at all. 
Limitations 
 As with any research, this study is not without limitations.  The main limitations are 
with the data itself.  First the data is in aggregate by geographic location and size.  
Individual property information is not available.  If properties are staffing differently, the 
differences may be hidden in the aggregate data.  The second limitation with the data is 
an extension of the first.  Since the data is in aggregate, ownership information is not 
available for particular properties.  While previous studies have shown mixed results on 
whether the percentage of ownership is a factor in expense preference behavior, the lack 
of this information in Nevada casinos does not allow this variable to be tested in this 
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study.  Another limitation of the data itself is that the data is annual.  Monthly data may 
show the effects of the predictor variables better and could be matched with the exact 
national recession dates. 
 An additional limitation is how recessionary periods are coded.  This study coded 
recessionary periods based on the National Bureau of Economic Research‟s recession 
dates and 6 months or more must have occurred during the fiscal year to code the entire 
year as a recession.  The national recession may not correspond to the periods that 
effected Nevada casinos.  As shown in Table 8, Nevada casinos had a decrease in 
revenue in fiscal years ending June 30, 2002 and 2010 as compared to the prior years.  
These may be considered recessionary periods in Nevada even though they were not on a 
national level.  Results were run with these new recessionary periods and the results are 
not significantly different, but if another indicator of recessionary periods is used they 
might differ.   
Future Research 
 This study leads itself into a few more studies based off the results and also the 
limitations.  The first area of future research could be duplication of this study with 
individual casino properties in Nevada.  With individual properties, an ownership 
variable may be able to be added to the models.  Not all individual properties financial 
information needs to be obtained.  Collecting a variety of properties from differing 
geographic locations and sizes and comparing the results to the results of this study will 
allow future researchers to see if there is a difference in the aggregate or individual 
results. 
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 Additional research could be done to determine why the revenue generated per 
employee is higher on additional revenue.  The level of fixed versus variable staffing may 
be a factor and further research into this breakdown may provide important information 
about an optimal level of staffing. 
 Additional research can be done to determine why Nevada casino firms were able to 
decrease the number of employees nearly 36% per Model 1 during a recession but only 
decreased salaries and wages 8% according to Model 2.  A better indication of employees 
may be full-time equivalents (FTEs) or hours worked.  This information was not 
available for this study, but in future research if individual property information is 
obtained, FTEs may be able to be studied.  Further evaluation of the decrease in 
employees could be conducted to understand if employees are working reduced or no 
hours during non-recessionary periods.  This is important because if management has too 
many employees that are not working, while there is no payroll related to these 
employees there are other expenses related to these employees.  These employees have to 
be recruited, hired, trained, and scheduled.  All these activities are operating expenses 
that have not been included in payroll related expenses.    
 An additional study could be done to understand the increase in total payroll as 
revenue increased.  The results of Model 3 showed that total payroll increased $64,000 
more than salaries and wages when revenue increased 1%.  This study did not evaluate 
taxes and benefits separately, but future research could be conducted see if the increase in 
total payroll was due to one or the other.  Payroll taxes are typically out of management‟s 
control but benefits may not be.  The future research could show if management controls 
payroll expenses by adjusting benefits as revenue changes.  In addition, the study can 
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evaluate why taxes and benefits are 41.6% of salaries and wages on each additional 1% 
of revenue but only 37% of salaries and wages for the mean. 
 Another suggested area for future research is based on the results of Model 3.  One 
could investigate how total payroll decreased less than salaries and wages during 
recessionary periods.  Taxes and benefits would need to be evaluated separately to see 
which one increased while salaries and wages decreased.   
Another area of future research would be a reexamination of this study 5 years after 
the 2007-2009 recessionary period.  A comparison could be made to see if casino 
managers maintained the efficient staffing levels and expenses they experienced during 
the recession or if they reverted back to the older staffing levels.  This research may also 
show that the managers staffed in between the two levels and learned they were 
overstaffed before the recession and maybe understaffed during the recession. 
Qualitative research could also be conducted to evaluate casino management‟s 
staffing decisions.  By doing field observations, researchers may gain a better 
understanding of why casino managers staff the way they do.  Researchers could try and 
determine is managers are staffing are needed for business volumes or if they empire 
building by staffing more than needed so they can do less or have more power.  A mixed 
methods research project could also be conducted with field observations and managerial 
psychology theory. 
Summary 
 By examining the relationship between casino revenue, market share and recessionary 
periods, the results of this dissertation show that Nevada casino managers may be 
exhibiting expense preference behavior in regards to payroll related expenses.  OLS 
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regression is used for Nevada casinos from 1990 to 2010 and results provide evidence 
that casino managers may be exhibiting expense preference behavior over shareholder 
wealth maximizing behavior in regards to payroll related expenses. 
 The results of this study confirm previous research that a firm‟s size has a positive 
effect on the number of employees and payroll related expenses.  The results do not 
confirm previous research in other industries that an increase in market share and a 
decrease in competition increases payroll related expenses and number of employees. 
This dissertation further evaluates the effects of a long-term recession on payroll related 
expenses and finds that casino managers are able to decrease the number of employees 
and payroll expenses beyond those necessary from just revenue decreases which may be 
an indication that casino managers are exhibiting expense preference behavior during 
non-recessionary periods. 
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